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 i 
Abstract 
 
Wheat trade accounts for one third of world grain trade and is expected to double by 
2050.The KRU (Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine) countries account for approximately a quarter 
of the world wheat exports and are collectively considered one of the key wheat exporting regions. 
Ukraine became a member of the WTO only in 2008. Russia became an official member of the 
WTO in 2012. Kazakhstan is expected to follow Russia and reach an accession deal with WTO 
members shortly. As a result of WTO accession, all three countries will be entitled to “most 
favoured nation” (MNF tariffs), and hence, gain improved access to a number of important 
markets that have been largely inaccessible due to very high tariffs that could be charged on 
imports from non-member countries. World wheat trade liberalization, reflecting the move to the 
MFN tariff as a result of accession, was simulated using the global simulation model (GSIM). The 
KRU region’s increased market accessibility as a result of successful accession to the WTO has 
the potential to foster important re-alignments in world wheat trade flows, prices and changes in 
welfare among major wheat trading countries. Simulation results suggest that increased access to 
markets leads to more trade between KRU countries and previously restricted markets. KRU 
countries trade more with now freer markets such as Turkey, the EU and China. Major traditional 
wheat exporters such as Australia, Canada, the EU, and the US do not seem to be negatively 
impacted to any important degree. Their relative market access conditions, however, erode in 
Turkish, Middle Eastern, and African markets with their trade flows being diverted and broadly 
distributed among other countries and regions at reduced prices. Trade liberalization is not 
uniform across regions and therefore leads to different net welfare changes across countries. 
However, those welfare changes appear to be modest.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Wheat is one of the first cereals to be domesticated in the world. It is and will likely continue 
be an important part of the global food basket. World population is expected to increase by 32 
percent reaching 9 nine billion by 2050 (US Census Bureau n.d.). In 2010 the world utilized 660 
million metric tons (MMT) of wheat and traded 125 MMT. Ceteris paribus, in 2050 the world’s 9 
billion people will consume over 880 MMT of wheat (Weigand 2011).  International trade will 
have a crucial role in fulfilling this increase in demand. Developing countries will account for the 
majority of the predicted population growth. Population growth is the strongest in tropical and 
subtropical regions where little wheat is grown.   
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO 2003) projects that 
developing countries will experience a significant growth in consumption. Based on forecasts of 
population, wheat production and consumption, North Africa, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Indonesia, the Philippines, Brazil, Mexico, and India will remain the largest importing 
areas. Domestic production in these countries is projected to increase by 23 percent whereas total 
consumption is expected to increase by 49 percent (Weigand 2011). According to the FAO 
(2003), the domestic production of developing countries will only cover approximately 86 
percent of their own total need, making them increasingly dependent on imports. The task of 
supplying wheat to the rest of the world will be spread among the world’s top wheat exporters; 
United States, Canada, Australia, the Black Sea region (Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan), the 
European Union and Argentina. These exporters will experience minimal or even negative 
population growth towards 2050 (Weigand 2011).         
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Currently, wheat trade accounts for one third of world grain trade. Weigand (2011) concluded 
that even with little import demand from China, world wheat trade is likely to double by 2050 
reaching a minimum of 240 MMT.   
The Black Sea region accounts for approximately one quarter of the world’s wheat exports 
and is considered one of the key wheat exporting areas. The first decade of the 21st century has 
been characterized by an increasing role of the Black Sea region in the global trade in wheat. 
Although highly variable, the Black Sea region’s average share of world wheat exports rose from 
three percent in 1992 to 12% in 2010. In comparison, over the same period the average share of 
world wheat exports declined by ten percent and six percent for United States and Canada 
respectively (USDA n.d.). 
1.2 Problem Statement 
The Black Sea Region’s accession to the WTO creates favourable conditions for its wheat 
export potential. Ukraine became a member of the WTO only in 2008. Russia was accepted to 
the WTO in 2012.   China’s record of 12 years of accession negotiations was exceeded by 
Russia’s experience. It took almost 19 years of negotiations for Russia to become a member of 
the WTO. Kazakhstan is expected to follow Russia and seal a deal with the WTO members in the 
near future. Kazakhstan’s negotiations have been ongoing for 16 years. The WTO accession 
Working Party for Kazakhstan was established in 1996. 
 As a result of WTO accession, all three countries will be entitled to “most favoured nation” 
(MFN tariffs), and, hence, gain improved access to potential markets previously largely 
inaccessible due to very high tariffs and/or other trade barriers that can be applied on imports 
from non members. For example, in 2010 China’s import duties for wheat for non-members of 
the WTO were equal to 180 percent, whereas MFN tariffs were equal to 65 percent. The potential 
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decrease in tariffs is substantial. The Black Sea region’s increased market accessibility as a result 
of successful accession to the WTO has the potential to bring about a major re-alignment of 
world wheat trade flows, prices and changes in welfare among major wheat trading countries.  
1.3 Objective of the Study 
In the light of the increasing importance of world wheat trade, examining the growing role of 
the Black Sea region on the international stage accompanied by trade policy changes is not only 
important but also timely. Therefore, the objective of this thesis is to simulate the changes arising 
in world wheat trade due to the KRU’s accession to the WTO and to estimate the changes in 
trade flows, prices, tariff revenues, exporter surplus and importer surplus. 
1.4 Organization of the Study 
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents background information on the wheat 
industry in KRU. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the international wheat trade. Chapter 4 
touches upon the accession process to the WTO in general and the accession histories of the 
KRU countries. Chapter 5 formally develops a Global Simulation Model (GSIM) for the world 
wheat industry. Quantitative results are reported in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 provides the important 
findings and implications. Chapter 8 concludes the thesis. 
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Chapter 2: The Wheat Industry in KRU 
2.1 The Wheat Industry in KRU 
The three major wheat-producing countries of the former Soviet Union − Russia, Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan  are becoming increasingly prominent in the global wheat trade. After the demise of 
the Soviet economic system, KRU has evolved from being net wheat importing region in the 
1980’s into a major wheat-exporting area and by 2005 it supplied almost a quarter of world 
wheat exports. The following section will describe KRU’s transition from 1980s to the present 
day and identify the possible reasons behind KRU’s emergence as an important wheat producing 
and exporting region.  
In wheat trade statistics, Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan are often referred to as Black Sea 
region exporters, RUK or KRU and reported in aggregate. The following is the map of Black Sea 
wheat exporters: 
Figure 1. Map of Black Sea wheat exporters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                  Source: Dumans and Nivet, 2003 
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The Black Sea is the main avenue for accessing world markets for all three countries. Figure 1 
shows the seaports on the Black Sea  used by grain exporters and important export destinations. 
Russia and Ukraine have the advantage of having several seaports. Ilychevtsk, Odessa and 
Mykolaev are Ukraine’s main seaports located in the Black Sea. Russia possesses both Baltic Sea 
and Black Sea exits to the world grain markets; Rostov and Novorossisk in the Black Sea, 
Kaliningrad and St. Petersbourg in Baltic Sea (see Figure 1). Kazakhstan, on the other hand, has 
no direct access to the Black Sea due to the landlocked nature of its territory. A more detailed 
discussion on transportation and logistics will be presented in the transition problems and 
constraints section below.  
 The following is a brief timetable showing KRU’s transition from being a major wheat 
importer as part of the USSR to becoming a major exporter in the 2000s (see Figure 2) 
Figure 2. KRU’s transition from importer to exporter 
 
The last decade of the USSR’s existence can be characterized by an intensification of the 
agricultural production. The major focus was given to cereal production, particularly winter 
wheat, and meat production. The Soviet government intended to increase consumers’ standard of 
living through increased consumption of meat and dairy products (Liefert et al. 2013). 
 
1970's-1980's Soviet 
Union as an importer
1991 End of Soviet Union. 
KRU's minor exports
2000-2012 KRU 
becomes a major exporter
2020-2030 KRU exports 
expected to grow 
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From: (FAOSTAT n.d.) 
Figure 3 illustrates the increase in the USSR’s meat production, particularly from 1970 up until 
1990. Domestic grain production could not satisfy the need to feed the ever increasing numbers 
of livestocks; therefore the Soviet Union had to import grain (Liefert et al. 2013) 
 The transition from central planning to a free market-based economy has been difficult 
for all three economies. As in the case with the broader economy, agricultural production 
plummeted with the collapse of central planning. The 1990s were characterized by a contraction 
in agricultural production, particularly livestock production. KRU’s animal numbers shrank by 
more than half. Liefert et al. (2013) argue that the decline of livestock production during the 
economic transition has been the major reason for KRU countries moving from being grain 
importers to grain exporters. The Table 1 illustrates the decrease in livestock inventory in KRU. 
There was a dramatic decrease in livestock inventory over the period from 1990 to 2011. For 
example, the number of cattle in Ukraine declined from 25.2 million head in 1990 to 4.5  
 7 
million head in 2011. The number of sheep and goats shrank from 9 million head in 1990 to just 
1.7 million head in 2011. 
 
 
The number of pigs declined from 19.9 million head in 1990 to 8 million head in 2011. Similar 
trends in livestock inventory can be observed in Kazakhstan and Russia.  
The second reason behind KRU’s increased exports is the rise of grain production in the 
2000s after a decline in early years of transition. The increase in grain production is due to 
increased yields rather than an expansion of  the land being cropped. The KRU utilized less area 
for grain production in 2011 than in the 1980’s. This could be partially due to the fact that during 
the Virgin Lands1 campaign, the massive increase in cropland fostered by the policy expanded 
into areas not really suitable for grain production2.  
                                                          
1 Virgin Lands campaign is the Soviet government’s (namely Nikita Khrushev’s) plan to boost the agricultural 
production. The campaign was implemented during 1950’s and early 1960’s. 
2 USSR’s eastern part of the grain belt (Kazakhstan, West Siberia) was particularly unsuitable for grain production 
due to climatic conditions  (Felix,1981). 
Large horned 
livestock
Sheep and 
goats
Pigs
Large horned 
livestock
Sheep and 
goats
Pigs
Large horned 
livestock
Sheep and 
goats
Pigs
1990 n.d n.d n.d 25.2 9.0 19.9 9.8 35.7 3.2
1991 n.d n.d n.d 24.6 8.4 19.4 9.6 34.6 3.0
1992 52.2 51.4 31.5 23.7 7.8 17.8 9.6 34.4 2.6
1995 39.7 28 22.6 19.6 5.6 13.9 6.9 19.6 1.6
2000 27.5 15 15.8 10.6 1.9 10.1 4.1 10.0 1.1
2005 21.6 18.6 13.8 6.9 1.8 6.5 5.5 14.3 1.3
2007 21.5 21.5 16.3 6.2 1.6 8.1 5.8 16.1 1.4
2008 21 21.8 16.2 5.5 1.7 7.0 6.0 16.8 1.3
2009 20.7 22 17.2 5.1 1.7 6.5 6.1 17.4 1.3
2010 20 21.8 17.2 4.8 1.8 7.6 6.2 18.0 1.3
2011 20.1 22.9 17.3 4.5 1.7 8.0 5.7 18.1 1.2
Note: Russian statistics does not report some years. Therefore those years were removed from the table. 
From: Statistics Agency of Kazakhstan n.d. RF Federal State Statistics Service n.d , State statistics services of Ukraine n.d
Russia Ukraine Kazakhstan
Table 1. KRU's Livestock Inventory (in million head)
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The Table 2 reports the changes in the area of grain production in the KRU over the 
period between 1987 and 2010.  
Russia Ukraine Kazakhstan KRU in total
1987-91 59.4 13.3 23.3 96
1992-95 54.7 12.2 20.8 87.4
1996-2000 47.4 11.9 13.3 72.6
2000-2005 42.7 13 13.9 69.6
2006-2010 42.7 13.9 15.9 72.5
Table 2. KRU grain area (in mln ha)
Note: Figures are average annual values during the period.
From: FAS Production, Supply and Distribution Online (USDA 2013)  
The area used for grain production fell during the early transition period in all three KRU 
countries. In 2010, the KRU countries were still using less land for grain production than they 
were in 1987. According to Prikhodko (2009), approximately 13 million ha of land can be 
returned into grain production in the KRU countries at no major environmental costs. However, 
returning idle lands back to production incurs additional costs for clearing and preparing the land 
for cultivation. 
The decrease in wheat yields in the KRU during the 1990s, followed by a small increase 
in the 2000s can be seen in Table 3.  
Russia Ukraine Kazakhstan
1987-91 1.61 3.27 0.89
1992-95 1.53 2.91 0.9
1996-2000 1.33 2.18 0.84
2000-2005 1.79 2.62 1.04
2006-2010 1.92 2.81 1.06
Note: Figures are average annual values during the period.
From: FAS Production, Supply and Distribution Online 
(USDA 2013)
Table 3. KRU grain yeild (in tons per ha)
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Yields in Russia and Kazakhstan have increase only marginally from 1987 to 2010, while the 
average grain yield in Ukraine decreased. Liefert et al.’s (2013) analysis indicates that the small 
increase in yields can be attributed to a rise in input productivity and favorable weather condition 
during the 2000s. However, yields in the KRU countries are still far below those in Canada, the 
USA or the EU3.  
 In the 2000s, KRU countries become major exporters and were responsible for almost a 
quarter of the world wheat exports by 2008. Figure 4 clearly demonstrates the growing 
importance of the KRU countries in international trade. 
 
From: USDA, Foreign Agricultural Services, Production, Supply and Distribution (PS&D) 
Database (USDA n.d.) 
KRU’s export share increased from only 2 percent in 1991 to 23 percent in 2008. Future 
projections are positive for KRU’s exports. By 2021, KRU is expected to account for 30 percent 
                                                          
3 In comparison, the average yield for the 2006-2010 periods is equal to 2.9, 5.25 and 2.67 tones per hectare in US, 
EU and Canada respectively (FAOSTATa n.d.) 
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of world wheat exports (USDAa n.d.). Ultimately however that will depend on the KRU 
countries’ ability to overcome some major transition problems and constraints.   
2.2 Transition Problems and Constraints 
Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan hold significant potential to expand their wheat exports. 
However, transportation and logistics problems as well as outdated agricultural equipment and 
practices continue to be major issues for KRU countries. Hence, it is worth keeping in mind that 
the major findings of the present research are subject to careful interpretation. For example, 
changes in future projected wheat trade between Kazakhstan and EU might not be achieved due 
to Kazakhstan’s transportation constraints. All of the KRU countries are still countries in 
transition and, hence, do not exhibit the same levels of efficiency as can be achieved in modern 
market economies. Further, their ability to respond to incentives may be inhibited. 
The KRU countries possess several exit routes to world wheat markets. They are Black 
Sea ports, Baltic Sea ports, Far Eastern ports, shallow water ports4 and, the Azov Sea and rail 
routes. A map of the KRU’s exit routes is provided in the Appendix A. All three countries are 
interested in increasing their grain handling capacities.  
There is a lack of official information on the exact capacities of ports and grain terminals. 
Therefore the information presented in this section is sourced primarily from various reports and 
newsletters. Numerical data on ports and terminal capacities are from estimates provided by 
market analysts. According to Vassilieva and Flake (2011), Russia’s overall port capacity is 
estimated at 25 million metric tones of wheat a year. Ukraine’s export capacity (Black Sea and 
Azov Sea) is estimated at more than 26 million metric tones a year (Prikhodko 2009). 
Information on Kazakhstan’s exact export capacity is non-existent.  
                                                          
4 Shallow water ports are ports along rivers.  
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The Black Sea ports are for the most part utilized by Ukraine and Russia. The ports of 
Novorosiisk, Tuapse and Taman are the larger ones utilized by Russia. Ukraine is in the most 
advantageous position in terms of reaching the Black Sea. It has Ilychevtsk, Odessa and 
Mykolaev and other smaller ports. 
Ukraine and Russia also possess shallow water ports such as those at Rostov-on-Don, 
Azov, Temruk, Kavkaz, Taganrog, and terminals on the Volga-Don (Vassilieva and Flake 2011). 
Most of these terminals are low capacity terminals that operate seasonally due to the rivers icing 
up. 
Kazakh wheat has to travel at least 3500 kilometers to reach the Black Sea and faces 
competition from the other two countries. Therefore, the use of Black Sea ports’ by Kazakhstan 
is limited. Kazakhstan has an access to world markets in the Caspian Sea and transports grain to 
the Black Sea and Baltic Sea by rail. Rail is also heavily used for exports to the neighboring 
central Asian countries. Table 4 shows KRU’s actual wheat export quantities by the mode of 
transportation/access route. 
 
 
 
 
As can bee seen from the Table 4, Black Sea deep-water ports are primarily used by Russia and 
Ukraine, Baltic Sea ports are utilized by Russia and Kazakhstan. Wheat exports from Kazakhstan 
to the neighboring countries, including China, are shipped by rail.  
Black Sea 
deep water 
ports
Black Sea 
shallow 
water ports
Baltic ports
Trains to 
export
Total 
Export
Russia 12 6 1 19
Ukraine 7.5 1 0 8.5
Kazakhstan 2 1 2 2.5 7.5
Table 4. KRU's Wheat Export Flow in 2011 by access route (in MMT)
Adapted from Boersch (2013).
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 According to Prikhodko (2009), Russia will increase its port capacity to handle 28 MMT 
of grain a year by 2015. Asian pacific markets are becoming more attractive to Russian wheat 
producers. Therefore, the Russian government is interested in developing grain terminals and 
increasing port capacity in Vladivostok on the Pacific (Baltinfo n.d.). The major concern is the 
cost of transportation from Siberian and Ural regions to Vladivostok. 
Inadequate grain handling capacities, logistics problems and aging rail infrastructure 
remain the main constraints faced by wheat producers in Russia. Seventy seven percent of the 
grain handling railway wagon fleet is expected to be written-off by 2015 (Baltinfo n.d.). 
Ukraine is the most fortunate of the KRU countries in terms of transportation costs. This 
is due to the short distances to the Black Sea. Ukraine’s transportation constraints are largely 
related to low rural railway loading capacities and poor administration of the rail system 
(Boersch 2013).  
Kazakhstan is also making efforts to increase its grain-handling infrastructure. 
Government officials expressed willingness to increase access to Middle Eastern markets by 
developing a rail line south from Kazakhstan through Turkmenistan to Iran (Prikhodko 2009). 
Kazakhstan is also planning to build terminals in Belorussia for grain shipment from the Baltic 
Sea. The recently developed Dostik-Alashankou rail route provides access for Kazakh grain to 
China and is now fully operational. Overall, the main obstacles faced by Kazakh wheat exports to 
the world markets are high transportation costs, restricted access to terminals and elevators in 
Black Sea ports and the risks associated with domestic policies5.  
It is difficult to talk about the farm level constraints across KRU countries in generalized 
terms. Nevertheless, it is evident that agro-holdings, also referred to as New Agricultural 
                                                          
5 Example: an export ban. 
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Operators, play a significant role in grain production in all KRU countries. There presence, 
however, varies in the three countries (Fellmann and Nekhay 2012). In Kazakhstan, twenty big 
companies account for approximately 80 percent of the grain output. Two hundred companies 
account for about 25 percent of the grain output in Russia. The importance of agro-holdings in 
the Ukraine is less prominent but they rapidly increased their operation in the second half of the 
2000s.  The average size of the agro-holding is 100 000 ha (Prikhodko 2009).   
Agro-holdings are vertically integrated entities that include agricultural production and 
processing facilities as well as grain elevators situated on the transport systems. They hold 
various advantages compared to smaller farms in terms of attracting investments, input purchases 
etc. The expansion of such integrated enterprises has been achieved through the acquisition of 
indebted former collective farms and elevators. Bank loans for large acquisitions are usually 
secured by the major downstream enterprises or holding companies (Wandel 2008). Apart from 
their own retained earnings, agro-holdings have access to bank loans for financing new 
technologies and western machinery. An agro-holding is controlled by a headquarters that is 
responsible for all financial, marketing and remote management activities of the enterprise. They 
enjoy economies of scale in terms of bulk input purchases and expert staff. Vertical integration 
allows for a better control over production methods, the quality of inputs and supply of outputs 
including exports of wheat. Agro-holdings maintain close relations with local authorities as well 
as with policy makers. These relationships allow them to garner state support when needed. 
Overcoming the major constraining factors faced by KRU is a matter of time and 
resources. Therefore, any significant changes in trade flows projected by the model are most 
likely achievable in the long run only.  
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2.3 Summary 
The KRU countries have become increasingly important in the world wheat trade. From 
being grain importers as part of the USSR, these three countries evolved into major wheat 
exporters. The transition from centrally planned command economies to the ones governed by 
market mechanisms has been difficult and is still continuing. Agriculture went through a major 
decline after the collapse of the Soviet Union. A drastic decline in livestock numbers, a marginal 
increase in yields and favorable weather conditions are considered to be the major factors that 
contributed to the increase in the KRU countries’ wheat exports. In 2008, the KRU region 
accounted for almost a quarter of the world wheat export market share and is expected by some 
to play an increasingly important role on the international stage in the future. However, transition 
problems and constraints remain. Significant investments in infrastructure are required to remove 
many of the constraints faced by KRU countries. Poor infrastructure, antiquated logistics and 
bottlenecks may yet hinder the KRU’s potential capacity to increase grain exports.        
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Chapter 3: International Wheat Trade 
 Wheat trade is and will likely be an increasingly important component of world trade in 
agrifood products and a contributor to global food security. Wheat accounts for one third of the 
world’s trade in cereals. In 2010, the world utilized 666 MMT and traded 126 MMT of wheat 
(FAO n.d.). Figure 5 shows the increasing importance of world wheat trade currently and in the 
future. 
 
 
 
 
 
From (OECD-FAO 2012) 
Most of the demand for wheat imports arises from the developing countries. In 2012, developing 
countries accounted for eighty percent of global wheat imports and are expected to account for 
approximately eighty percent of the demand for wheat imports in the future (see Table 5) 
(OECD-FAO 2012).  
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Year
World Total 
imports
Developing 
countries
Developing 
countries in 
% from 
total world 
imports
2012 137 110 80
2013 137 111 81
2014 137 111 81
2015 139 113 81
2016 140 115 82
2017 144 118 82
2018 145 120 83
2019 148 123 83
2020 150 125 83
2021 152 127 83
Table 5. Share of Developing countries in World 
Wheat imports (in MMT)
From: OECD-FAO (2012)  
Increase in wheat consumption is often associated with the increase in population because these 
two mirror each other. According to US Census Bureau, the world population will reach 9 billion 
people by 2050 (US Census Bureau n.d.). Figure 6 shows the expected increase in world 
population. Developing countries will account for the majority of the predicted population 
growth. Population growth is the strongest in tropical and subtropical regions where little wheat 
is grown.  
 As reported above, in 2010 the world utilized 666 MMT of wheat and traded 126 MMT 
of wheat. Ceteris paribus, in 2050 the world’s 9 billion people will consume over 880 MMT of 
wheat (Weigand 2011).  Based on population growth, wheat production and consumption 
projections, Weigand (2011) concluded that even with little import demand from China, world 
wheat trade is likely to double by 2050 reaching a minimum of 240 MMT. International trade 
will have a crucial role in fulfilling this increase in demand.  
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Various agricultural outlooks and market analysis reports identify several geographical 
regions where wheat is an important factor in future wheat production and/or consumption: North 
America, South America, Central America, EU, rest of the Europe, Middle East, North Africa, 
Sub Saharan Africa, East Asia, South Asia, South East Asia, the Former Soviet Union and Others. 
Market analysis discussion by FAO, UNDP, etc. usually provide statistics and forecast for the 
aggregated regions listed above.  
 
From: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2011)  
The FAO (2003) projects that developing countries will experience a significant growth in 
consumption. Based on forecasts of population, wheat production and consumption, North Africa, 
the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Indonesia, the Philippines, Brazil, Mexico, and India will 
remain the largest importing areas. Domestic production of these countries is projected to 
increase by 23 percent whereas total consumption is expected to increase by 49 percent 
(Weigand 2011). According to the FAO, domestic cereal production of developing countries will 
only cover approximately 86 percent of their own total need, making them increasingly 
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dependent on imports (FAO 2003). The task of supplying wheat to the rest of the world will be 
spread among the world’s top wheat exporters; the United States, Canada, Australia, the Black 
Sea region, EU and Argentina. These exporters will experience minimal or even negative 
population growth towards 2050.  
Table 6 provides the list of the top ten wheat importers in the world in 2012. 
Rank Country Quantity (in Million tons)
1 Egypt 9.3
2 Indonesia 6.3
3 Brazil 6.0
4 Japan 5.6
5 Algeria 5.2
6 Morocco 4.4
7 South Korea 4.3
8 Iraq 3.7
9 Iran 3.6
10 Mexico 3.4
Total Imports 139.4
Table 6. Top 10 Net Wheat Importers in 2012 
From: USDA, Foreign Agricultural Services, Production, 
Supply and Distribution (PS&D) Database (USDA n.d.)
 
       As can be seen from the Table 6, the top wheat importers are all countries of North Africa, 
Middle East, Asia and South America. Table 7 provides a list of top ten wheat exporters. Russia, 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan are all included in the top ten list of exporters. They are reported 
separately in Table 7, however combined KRU exports are slightly less than US exports and 
exceed those of Canada. 
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Rank Country Quantity (in Million tons)
1 United States 25.0
2 Canada 18.1
3 Australia 16.4
4 European Union 12.0
5 Russia 9.0
6 Kazakhstan 7.0
7 India 6.5
8 Ukraine 6.1
9 Argentina 5.0
10 Uruguay 1.0
Total Exports 132.0
From: USDA, Foreign Agricultural Services, Production, 
Supply and Distribution (PS&D) Database (USDA n.d.)
Table 7. Top 10 Net Wheat Exporters in 2012
 
 In short, the importance of world trade in wheat is expected to grow. Developing 
countries of North Africa, the Sub-Saharan region, the Middle East, South America and Asia will 
experience the greatest increase in population and are expected to generate most of the increase 
in demand for wheat in the future. On the other hand, traditional wheat exporting countries will 
experience no dramatic increase in population or changes in consumption and therefore have the 
opportunity to fill in the gap in the increasing demand for wheat.  
 Trade barriers however, constrain trade in wheat and alter its distribution among countries. 
A major change in trade constraints, such as those arising from accession to the WTO, can have a 
major impact on the international trade in wheat. The affect of WTO accession on trade barriers 
is provided in Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 4: The WTO Accession Process 
4.1 The WTO Accession process 
One of the oldest forms of international relations is international trade. Accelerating the 
international division of labour, foreign trade was and remains a basis of the international 
economic relations that connects all countries to the global economy. Foreign trade can play a 
vital role in a country’s economic growth and development. As with any international relations, 
there is a need for rules of conduct. This is particularly true in the case of international trade. 
Firms that wish to make investments in international trading activities need to know that their 
investments are not at risk from governments acting in ways that make what were initially 
profitable investments, unprofitable. For example, governments can put a profitable investment 
at risk by putting in place trade barriers. The World Trade Organization is the most important 
multilateral trade institution that administers an agreed set of rules for international trade  rules 
that have been agreed, to date, by 159 countries. Formed in 1995, as a successor to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the WTO administers the agreed rules of international trade. 
The WTO rules govern approximately 97 percent of global trade. 
Making trade flow smoothly and in predictable ways is at the core of the existence of the 
WTO trading system. The WTO lists numerous benefits 6  arising from its existence that 
collectively promote international development, cooperation and confidence. Confidence in 
being treated equally and fairly is important for countries, and their firms that wish to invest in 
international trade activities.  Being a member of the system of agreed rules means that a firm is 
                                                          
6 The ten benefits of joining the WTO: 1. The system helps promote peace. 2. Disputes are handled constructively. 3. 
Rules make life easier for all. 4. Freer trade cuts the costs of living. 5. It provides more choice of products and 
qualities. 6. Trade raises incomes.   7. Trade stimulates economic growth.  8. The basic principles make life more 
efficient. 9. Governments are shielded from lobbying. 10. The system encourages good government (WTO n.d.) 
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better shielded from unfair treatment, sudden protectionist measures or other political matters. 
Membership means being not discriminated against and being entitled to receive the same trading 
conditions as every other member of the WTO. Of course, trade disputes will remain, however 
the WTO trading system with a set of rules and conditions reached by consensus allows the 
handling trade disputes in a transparent and structured manner. The equality provided by the 
WTO membership manifests itself through the import tariffs that firms face in foreign markets. 
There is a considerable difference between tariffs applied to members and non-members of the 
WTO. Countries are not entitled to MFN tariffs unless they are members of the WTO.  
Before enjoying the security provided by WTO membership, each country wishing to join 
the WTO has to go through a five-stage accession process. First, after gaining observer status, the 
country has to submit a memorandum outlining how its trade and economic policies align, or not, 
with the WTO’s agreed rules. The memorandum is examined by a Working Party that includes 
all interested member countries. After a Working Party has made sufficient progress on ensuring 
the applicant country’s policies align with the rules, countries start bilateral negotiations. 
Although each interested country negotiates on tariff reductions and other trade inhibiting 
policies that determine export opportunities for its exporting firms, commitments made in 
bilateral negotiation will apply equally to all other members following the WTO principle of 
non-discrimination. The number of bilateral negotiations depends on the number of countries that 
comprise the Working Party. The third step starts when the applicant’s trade regime is re-
examined for compliance with the rules and bilateral talks are complete. The final accession 
terms are reflected in a formal protocol of accession and tariff schedules. The fifth and final step 
is the submission of a final package that consists of the protocol and schedules. The final package 
is presented to the WTO General Council or a Ministerial Conference. The observer is then free 
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to join the organization if two-thirds of the WTO members vote in the affirmative (WTO 
Information and External Relations Devision 2011) 
4.2 The History of Accession for KRU countries 
Accession to the WTO promotes the further integration of a country into modern 
economic trade relations. The duration of the process of accession to the WTO differs from one 
case to another depending on the number of bilateral negotiation that have to be completed to 
achieve consensus. Political matters can also slow the accession process down. For comparison, 
it took nineteen years of negotiations for Russia to become a member of the WTO but, for 
example less than three years for Kyrgyzstan.  
After the demise of the Soviet Union and the achievement of independent country status, 
Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan applied for membership in the World Trade Organization. 
Russia was first to express its willingness to join the WTO (GATT7 at the time). In June 1993, 
Russia submitted the official application to the Secretariat of the GATT.  The Working Party 
chaired by Mr. W. Rossier8 (Switzerland) was established the same year and consisted of 58 
members. Subsequently, the Working Party was chaired by two other ambassadors − Kare Bryn 
(Norway) from 2000 to 2003 and Stefán Jóhannesson (Iceland) from 2003 to 2011. A 
memorandum on Russia’s Foreign Trade regime was circulated by the Secretariat in 1994. The 
process proceeded with questions and feedback to Russian authorities. The Working Party 
meetings commenced in 1995. There were, in total, 31 formal Working Party meetings as well as 
numerous informal ones. The most difficult bilateral negotiations were those with the EU, China, 
                                                          
7 GATT-General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was replaced by WTO on January 1, 1995 under the Marrakesh 
Agreement  
8 Different country representatives at the United Nations and other international organizations in Geneva usually 
chair the WTO working parties.  
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the US and during most recent years Georgia9 (Babkin et al. 2012). After 2000, the negotiations 
covered all aspects of Russia’s accession to the WTO including it’s commitments concerning the 
tariff schedule, market access to goods and services and agriculture. Finally, nineteen years of 
difficult negotiations yielded results. Russia’s accession package, the biggest accession package 
in the history of the WTO, was approved by the Eighth Ministerial Conference in 2011. On 
August 22, 2012 Russia notified the WTO Secretariat of the ratification of the package and 
officially became a member of the WTO.  
Among KRU countries, Ukraine was the first to accede the WTO. Ukraine submitted its 
application to the WTO after Russia, in November 1993. The Working party was established the 
same year in December. The memorandum on Ukraine’s trade regime was circulated in 1994. 
Throughout the accession process, Ukraine’s Working party was chaired by three ambassadors; 
Mr. A. Stoler (US), Mr. S. Marchi (Canada) and Mr. M. Matus (Chile). The process of Ukraine’s 
accession can essentially be divided in to three periods. The first period, 1993-1997, was 
dedicated to the analysis and monitoring of the economy to determine if it reflected GATT/WTO 
norms and regulations. The second period, 1998-2003, entailed the process of enforcing laws 
deemed a priority for accession in order to adjust regulations in accordance with the WTO norms. 
The final, stage, 2003-2008, can be described as a process of identifying Ukraine’s commitments 
regarding its membership to the WTO. The 2005-2007 period produces a breakthrough in the 
negotiation process. During that period Ukraine was able to reach agreement with 52 member 
states of the WTO and ratify 55 laws in accordance with the WTO norms (Pugachev 2012). In 
2008, after 15 years of negotiation, Ukraine was officially welcomed into the WTO.  
The negotiation process for Kazakhstan’s accession to the World Trade Organization 
started on the 29th of January in 1996, with the submission of the official application to 
                                                          
9 An armed conflict between Georgia and Russia took place in August 2008. 
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Secretariat of the WTO. In February of the same year, Kazakhstan was assigned status as an 
“observer” country to the WTO. On April 16, in 1996, the General Council of the WTO 
established a Working Party to examine the application and provide recommendations, including 
comments on a draft of the Protocol of Admission. Any interested member country could join the 
Working Party. Members of the Working Party were then encouraged to submit questions on 
Kazakhstan’s Memorandum on its Foreign Trade regime that was circulated by the Secretariat, 
on 11 November, 1996. The feedback and questions were then transmitted to the Kazakhstan's 
authorities for further examination and comment. The Memorandum reflected on Kazakhstan’s 
economy, economic policies and foreign trade regimes at that time. Government officials 
acknowledged that Kazakhstan’s key trade legislation met the most important WTO principles 
and committed Kazakhstan to bringing them in to full compliance with the WTO’s agreed rules. 
All the ministries of the Kazakhstan Government were urged to ensure full compliance of their 
legislation with the WTO standards (WTO 1996).  To date, Kazakhstan’s Working Party consists 
of 43 members and is chaired by H.E. Mr. Hannu Himanen. The Working Party members include 
the EU and its members as one. Each bilateral negotiation has to finish with a bilateral agreement. 
Members of the Working Party consist of all the main trading partners of Kazakhstan that belong 
to the WTO which have expressed a desire to discuss conditions for, and obligations of, the 
country’s accession to WTO. Kazakh government officials have been releasing statements which 
anticipated accession each year since 2010. Hence, it is difficult to determine whether 
Kazakhstan will finally accede to the WTO by the end of 2013, as is planed. 
4.3 Summary 
KRU countries have gone through a long accessing journey. Russia and Ukraine have 
successfully joined the WTO, while Kazakhstan is expected to join them shortly. To date, the 
WTO governs the trade between 159 countries. Becoming a member of the WTO trading system 
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is an important step towards integration into the world economy for every country. Most of all, 
membership in the WTO provides confidence. In other words, membership provides equal access 
to markets and a common trade dispute resolution mechanism. Before enjoying the confidence 
offered by the WTO, each country has to go through a five-stage accession process. First, the 
potential accessing country submits its Memorandum on foreign trade. The second stage involves 
revision of the memorandum by the Working party. The third stage begins with the re-
examination of the trade regime according to the WTO rules and bilateral negotiations. 
Accession terms are then reflected in a formal protocol and presented to the WTO General 
Council or a Ministerial Conference as a final package. Once the final package is voted in 
affirmative by the two-thirds of the WTO members, the observer country if welcomed to join the 
WTO. 
Given that the KRU countries accession to the WTO will result in those countries being 
eligible to have MFN tariff applied on their wheat, important changes in the world trade in wheat 
can be anticipated. In Chapter 5, those expected changes are formally modeled.  
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Chapter 5: Modeling Global Wheat Trade 
5.1 Literature review 
Considerable effort has been devoted to developing models that can be applied  to trade 
policies for agricultural products. Building an applied trade model is a costly, rigorous process 
that requires time and effort to be spent on assembling a database, the formulation of the 
theoretical underpinnings, obtaining estimates of parameters and shocking the model in 
simulations (Tongeren et al. 2001). None of the existing modeling approach is flawless. In each 
particular case one model is more applicable than the other. A detailed and comprehensive 
review and assessment of the existing global models applied to agriculture and trade policies is 
provided by Tonegeren et al. (2001). They discuss a number of partial equilibrium and general 
equilibrium models developed in the 1990s. Their review provides a comparative assessment of 
alternative modeling approaches by highlighting common features, differences and areas of 
applicability10. Of course, no model is appropriate for all purposes. Researchers have to use their 
own judgment and choose a model that is capable of providing answers to the question of interest 
given the information available and constraints on research resources.  
In general terms, modeling approaches differ based on scope, specifications, assumptions, 
etc. Trade models are often multiregional. Multiregional trade models can differ with respect to 
the regional coverage. Some models focus on a certain set of trading partners, whereas others 
attempt to account for worldwide trade. A set of countries are often aggregated as one block such 
as the previous 15 members of the European Union (EU-15)11, the former Soviet Union (FSU) or 
the Rest of the World ROW (ROW). Models differ in terms of being dynamic or static, partial or 
                                                          
10 For a detailed discussion and list of agricultural policy models see F. von Tongeren et al. (2001) 
11 EU-15 countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, German, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. 
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economy-wide models. Dynamic models allow for time and adjustment paths. Static models 
observe differences between equilibriums resulting from the shocks in variables (for example, 
policy changes or crop failures).  
A choice between a partial-equilibrium (PE) and a general-equilibrium (GE) modeling 
approaches is one of the key decisions faced by the analyst. This choice involves a trade-off. This 
trade off is best demonstrated in the following Table 8. (see Table 8). 
PE GE
Capturing economy wide linkages x
Consistency with the budget constraints x
Capturing disaggregated effects x
Capturing complicated policy mechanisms x
Use of timely data x
Capturing short and med. term effects x
Capturing long term effects x
Source: Bacchetta et al, 2012
Table 8. Partial vs. general equilibrium models
 
General-equilibrium models are able to capture economy-wide linkages and long term effects of 
the shocks. Partial equilibrium (PE) models, on the other hand, can be as disaggregated as one 
wishes. Partial equilibrium models are generally easy to use and straightforward to interpret as a 
relatively limited number of equations are used to calculate changes in demand and supply. As 
only one sector is modeled, PE models typically require less data than GE models: usually trade 
flows, trade policy data and elasticities (Bacchetta et al. 2012). PE models’ simplicity and ease, 
however, is partially offset by a number of limitations. One of the major limitations is that PE 
models do not include constraints on factors of production. Second, PE model results are 
sensitive to the chosen values of elasticities. Effects on other markets are also lost. 
 Despite these limitations, PE models are widely applied to research on an industry level. 
Partial equilibrium models of trade in agriculture are often focused on primary commodities. 
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Partial equilibrium models treat agricultural trade as being isolated from the rest of the economy. 
Economy-wide GE models, on the other hand, account for inter-industry relations, thus allowing 
the implications of international trade on the economy as a whole to be observed. Economy-wide 
models are, of course, much more data intensive than the partial equilibrium models. Parameter 
estimates such as price and income elasticities, and/or substitution elasticities are also crucial for 
GE modeling approach. These key parameters determine the extent of response shocks including 
policy changes. They must be consistent with the available data and economic theory (Tongeren 
et al. 2001).  Key parameters can be determined via two different approaches, either 
econometrically or by calibration. Econometric estimation of parameters is resource intensive 
and should be performed by simultaneous equation estimation methods that take into account the 
overall model structure (Tongeren et. al. 2001). Calibration, also known as the “synthetic 
approach”, is a more popular because it is much less resource intensive. Using estimates of 
elasticities from existing sources, the calibration approach generates parameters consistent with 
the pre-shock benchmark data and the theory underlying the model. 
 Due to their simplicity and transparency, partial equilibrium models have been widely 
used in the policy assessment and economic welfare literature. Partial equilibrium models range 
from simple single market representations to more complicated, multi region global models. 
Recent partial equilibrium agricultural trade models include the USDA’s Statistical World Policy 
Simulation (SWOPSIM) developed by Roningen et al. (1991), World Bank and UNCTAD 
Software for modeling Market Analysis and Restrictions on Trade (SMART), the Agricultural 
Trade Policy Simulation Model (ATPSM) developed by United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (Vanzetti and Peters 2004, Bacchetta et al. 2012) and the Global Simulation 
model (GSIM) developed by Francois and Hall (2003). 
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 Economy-wide models have been developed by the Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) by Hertel (1997), the US Applied General Equilibrium model developed by the 
International Trade Commission (USITC 2004), MEGABARE and GTEM developed by the 
Australian Bureau of Agriculture and Resource Economics (ABARE 1996). The list of modeling 
approaches mentioned in this review is by no means exhaustive. This review is focused mainly 
on the models utilized specifically in agricultural trade policy and welfare research. 
Most of the research related to modeling world wheat markets dates back to 1970s. Early 
studies accounted for the Soviet Union as a single market. In the 1990s, Russia, Kazakhstan and 
Ukraine were not yet considered as important exporting countries and, therefore, were often 
ignored in the model design. Further, command economy era data was not considered reliable 
and these economies exhibited considerable disequilibrium in the early years of transition. The 
latter meant that the data was unreliable for modeling purposes because the adjustments 
processes required to reach equilibrium were not well understood. The following is a short 
description of a number of models used specifically to examine the international market for 
wheat. 
Large and complicated models applied to trade in wheat were developed by Devadoss et 
al. (1990) and Roningen et al. (1991).  The Food and Agriculture Policy Research Institute 
(FAPRI) model produced by Devadoss et al. (1990) incorporates a set of models that can 
determine the effects of alternative farm policies and program proposals on agricultural 
commodity markets as well as the agricultural sector of the US. In general, models are solved 
iteratively to arrive at a simultaneous solution. A solution is obtained whenever the demand is 
equal to supply in each market, and the same vector of prices and other endogenous variables is 
obtained for all component models (Devadoss et al. 1990). One of the set of FAPRI models is 
focused specifically on trade in wheat. It is a non-spatial, partial equilibrium model. Non-spatial 
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means it does not identify trade flows between specific countries (Devadoss et al. 1990). The 
model consists of domestic supply and demand functions for major wheat trading and producing 
countries and regions. Equilibrium prices, quantities and net trade are determined by equating 
import and export functions of different regions and linking regional prices to world prices. 
Being fairly detailed, this trade model has been used to analyse the impacts of exogenous shocks 
such as technological change, yield changes, income growth, inflation, or changes in exchange 
rates, etc. FAPRI is often used in United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and 
Agriculture Policy related institutions’ publications. Although primarily focused on the US, the 
FAPRI model has been used to produce global agricultural commodity outlooks.  One of the 
major features of the FAPRI model is its ever expansion. The model is always kept updated and 
is being enhanced in order to address novel policy questions. The benefits from an expanded 
model, however, carry certain costs. Although a larger model is suited to a broader range of 
questions, less focus can be given to any one specific part of the model (Meyers et al. 2010).  
The Static World Policy Simulation (SWOPSIM) model developed by Roningen et 
al.(1991) has also been used extensively in USDA research. It is a static, partial equilibrium 
model that simulates the effects of changes in agricultural support on production, consumption 
and trade. Most of the research utilizing the SWOPSIM model dates back to the 1980s. 
According to Tongeren et al.(2001), the model is no longer in use.  
Both FAPRI and SWOPSIM assume homogeneity of wheat across countries. Benirschka 
and Koo (1995) have relaxed the assumption of homogeneity. They developed a dynamic multi-
commodity model that includes eleven wheat classes.  The World Wheat Policy Simulation 
model is a hybrid between an econometric model and a synthetic model, meaning that some of 
the behavioural equations are estimated while others are based on synthetic parameters 
(Benirschka and Koo, 1995). A different approach was taken to modeling the exporting and 
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importing sub models that account for acreage harvested, yield, production, domestic 
consumption, and carryout stocks. The import side country sub models were estimated based on 
Armington’s12 approach to demand.  This approach reduces the number of parameters that have 
to be estimated and allows for product differentiation. 
Another method that has been used in wheat trade research is that of Spatial Equilibrium 
modeling (SEM). Gomez-Plana and Devadoss (2004) provide an evaluation of trade policy 
impacts in world wheat markets using SEM. They argue that the wheat markets’ price decline in 
the early 2000’s can be attributed to a surge in supply combined with restrictive trade barriers. 
The study provides a simulation of the elimination of all import tariffs and subsidies. The effects 
of trade liberalization are reported in terms of changes in price, supply, demand, imports, exports 
and welfare changes in each region/ country. A spatial equilibrium model popularized by 
Takayama and Judge (1971) was adapted for the wheat market. Thirty two countries were 
included in the modeling exercise. They are separated by distance and are assumed to trade 
homogeneous wheat competitively. SEM employs a non-linear optimization to maximize the net 
social monetary gain function, subject to a set of constraints (Gomez-Plana and Devadoss 2004). 
Elasticity parameters were adopted from secondary literature. Gomez-Plana and Devadoss (2004) 
arrived at the following main conclusions: wheat trade liberalization leads to an increase 
(decrease) in prices in the exporting (importing) country; production and exports increase in the 
exporting countries, consumption and imports increase in importing countries. As a result, there 
is an overall increase in trade. Most of the countries gain as a result of more trade; hence, there is 
an overall world welfare increase.  
                                                          
12 Armington (1969) proposed a general theory of demand that distinguishes products according to their place of 
production. The Armington assumption states that products traded internationally are differentiated by the country of 
origin. The source of differentiation can be different bilaterally applied tariffs between countries 
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A spatial model refers to a mathematical programming model that focuses on 
transportation costs (Benirschka and Koo 1995). Accounting for transportation costs in a global 
scale trade modeling exercise is problematic. Choosing proxies for transportation costs in world 
wheat trade for each country is cumbersome. Obtaining reliable transport cost data is one of the 
main difficulties in analysing transportation (Inmaculada and Celestino 2005). There are, 
however, official sources that provide fairly detailed information on transportation costs. The US 
Census Bureau’s “US Imports of merchandise” is one of the most extensive. It provides custom 
information including freight rates along with loading and unloading costs. Unfortunately, this is 
rather an exception. No similar information is found for other countries (Inmaculada and 
Celestino 2005). Therefore, utilizing a spatial model in the context of this thesis is not feasible.  
Another popular approach to the analysis of trade policy is gravity modeling13. The 
gravity model is used to explain the impact of trade policies on trade between different 
geographical entities. The gravity model takes an ex-post approach to policy analysis. It means 
that gravity models are used to measure the effects on trade flows of a past trade policy (Ivus and 
Strong 2007).  Unlike partial or general equilibrium models, a gravity model is not capable of 
measuring direct estimates of welfare costs. Gravity modeling is not regarded as suitable in the 
context of this research.  
As the subject of interest is the effect of tariff reduction on world wheat trade and the 
resulting welfare changes, the GSIM model of Francois and Hall (2003) was chosen as the most 
suitable. The GSIM is capable of addressing the issue of trade liberalization on a single industry 
level and has resource requirements that are manageable. It is a static, multi-regional, partial 
equilibrium, Armington–type product differentiation model that solves for equilibrium prices by  
satisfying global market clearing conditions; that is, global imports must equal exports. 
                                                          
13  For a more detailed discussion on gravity models and their basic specifications refer to Ivus and Strong (2007).  
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Armington type product differentiation means that the products originating from different 
countries are imperfect substitutes. The heterogeneity of the products among countries comes 
from the different bilaterally imposed tariffs (for example, the US and Russia faced different 
tariffs imposed by China before Russia’s accession to the WTO).  These tariffs determine the 
relative price of goods. Therefore change in tariffs translates into import changes by source. 
The GSIM requires a bilateral trade matrix at world prices, an initial and final matrix of 
bilateral import tariffs, export supply elasticities, aggregate import demand elasticities and 
elasticities of substitution. Trade liberalization effects are reflected in terms of bilateral trade 
changes, welfare effects (producer surplus, consumer surplus and change in tariff revenues), 
price and change in output. The GSIM is flexible, transparent, user friendly and suitable tool to 
conduct the analysis required for this particular research. It captures the effects of bilateral tariff 
changes on international commodity trade using minimum data requirements and presents the 
results in an accessible format.  
Although fairly recently developed, the GSIM model has found application in several 
recent studies of trade liberalization. Using the GSIM model, Leudjou (2012) simulates 
multilateral tariff reduction scenarios for the Cameroon dairy sector. The objective was to assess 
the impact of trade liberalization on food security in the Cameroon dairy sector, specifically 
domestic prices and consumer welfare effects. The dairy sector remains one of the most protected 
agricultural industries in the world. Leudjou (2012) discusses the importance of the dairy 
industry in Cameroon, tariff protection levels both in Cameroon and major dairy producers in the 
world, and proposed tariff reduction measures proposed in the Doha round14. The empirical work 
was carried out using GSIM model with a total of 23 countries including the major exporters and 
importers of dairy products along with Cameroon. Bilateral trade and tariff data was sourced 
                                                          
14 The Doha Round is the latest round of trade negotiations among WTO members. It started in 2001  
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from WITS (n.d) and MacMap (n.d). Elasticity values were adopted from Nicita and Ollareaga 
(2006) and Kee, Nicita and Ollareaga (2004). Leudjou undertook three trade liberalization 
scenarios.  
Holzner and Peci (2012) studied Kosovo’s potential integration into the European Union 
(EU) and the resulting trade liberalization effects on Kosovo’s major industries. The estimations 
were performed for 27 industries at the ISIC 2-digit levels15. The authors simulated a full trade 
liberalization scenario between Kosovo and the EU, meaning zero tariff rates were assumed for 
Kosovo’s imports from the EU. Holzner and Peci (2012) also provide a brief rationale behind 
their chosen elasticity values. Export supply elasticity of 1.5, aggregate import demand elasticity 
of -1.25 and an elasticity of substitution equal to 5 were adopted from Francois and Hall (2003). 
An infinite export supply elasticity (9999999) was adopted for the EU and the rest of the world 
(ROW) to flatten out the supply curve and mimic a small versus large country assumption. 
Although assumptions regarding the elasticities were simplified, given the available data, 
identifying “true elasticities” is nearly impossible (Holzner and Peci 2012). The authors also 
refer to other research to determine alternative values for the elasticities. The trade liberalization 
simulation revealed a net negative welfare effect for Kosovo. Welfare loses were due, for the 
most part, to losses in tariff revenue. Holzner and Peci (2012) concluded that trade liberalization 
between Kosovo and the EU will not substantially diversify Kosovo’s export profile. Increased 
competitiveness could be reached through an improved investment climate as well as better 
institutional and physical infrastructure.   
A number of trade liberalization case studies based on GSIM measurements were 
performed by Holzner. Holzner (2008) measures the effects of a potential accession of the 
                                                          
15 ISIC-The International Standard of Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities developed by UN as a 
standard way of classifying economic activities. For example: 01-Agriculture, 02-Forestry...17-Textiles, etc. 
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Balkan countries and Turkey to the EU on agricultural trade. The author concluded that 
agricultural trade liberalization will primarily benefit the accessing countries, while EU members 
will be affected only to a minor degree. Holzner (2008) also calls for great caution when 
interpreting the results of the GSIM model. The author refers to the GSIM’s partial equilibrium 
nature and warns of its inability to capture second round effects or resource reallocation effects in 
the economy at large. Nevertheless, if model limitations are kept in mind, important implications 
of trade liberalization can be drawn from the model’s results. The GSIM’s limitations as well as 
the limitations of this study will be reported separately in Chapter 8.  
Using GSIM, Mutambatsere (2006) attempted to evaluate the implications of freer trade 
policies on cereal markets in the southern African region. The model included 13 countries of 
sub–Sahara Africa. Intra-regional trade is simulated with the inclusion of extra regional trade in 
form of ROW. In accordance with the Armington assumption, commodities are not 
homogeneous across borders. Imports originating from different countries are considered 
imperfect substitutes of each other. Data was obtained from World Integrated Trade Solutions 
(WITS) database, the US International Trade Commission (USITC), the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) dataset FAOSTAT, the Trade Analysis Information System (TRAINS) and 
national statistical agencies. Elasticity coefficients were sourced from secondary literature. A 
sensitivity analysis was performed to ensure the robustness of the results and to determine the 
lower and upper bounds of the expected welfare changes. Mutambatsere (2006) attempted to 
answer whether trade openness increases aggregate supply of cereals available at lower prices to 
consumers; if increased trade improves regional wealth through higher grain producer surplus 
and increased buying power of consumers. The analysis suggests that, all else being constant, 
freer intra-regional trade results in a minimal increase of the aggregate supply of cereals and a 
slight drop in average prices. An increased intra-regional trade and decreased trade with the rest 
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of the world is suggestive of a diversion of trade from the world to the region.  No conclusive 
result was obtained with respect to an increase in vulnerability to the external shocks. 
Mutambatsere (2006) concludes that intra-regional tariff elimination does not induce greater 
regional supply of cereals.  
Vanzetti et al. (2005) employed the GSIM model in an analysis of policy changes in the 
EU banana market. They assessed the impact of a removal of banana import quotas and the shift 
of the EU regime to a tariff only system. The model includes twenty regions including the main 
banana producers and exporters. Again, assumptions on elasticity values were obtained from 
secondary sources. Three alternative trade liberalization scenarios were assessed. The first 
scenario assumed the removal of both tariff and quotas by the EU, while the other two scenarios 
assumed the presence of two different tariffs on non African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
country imports. Vanzetti et al. (2005) concluded that the abolition of banana imports quotas can 
potentially result in the transfer of quota rents to EU consumers. Total EU banana market 
liberalization results in a thirty percent decrease in prices and, hence, increased consumption of 
bananas. There is also a considerable increase in EU consumer surplus. An increased demand for 
bananas is expected to be satisfied by non-ACP countries (Venzetti et al., 2005).  
Serletis and Fetzer (2008) assessed the impact of the 2004 US tobacco quota buyout in 
US and foreign markets using GSIM. The GSIM model results are usually perceived to be either 
over or under estimates because of its partial equilibrium nature. They compared the model 
output with the actual post-buyout changes in trade flows of US produced tobacco. The 
simulation results and actual changes were of the same magnitude and, therefore, appeared to be 
realistic (Serletis and Fetzer 2008).  
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Worz et al (2007) undertook an analysis of Russia’s WTO accession and its implication 
for the Russian economy using GSIM. Partial equilibrium modeling was applied to different 
sectors of the economy separately: agriculture and food, chemicals, metals, textiles and clothing 
and machinery and vehicles. They concluded that losses associated with greater trade 
liberalization are rather insignificant for Russia (Worz, et al. 2008).  
Choosing the appropriate modeling approach in trade policy analysis involves a trade off.  
In general terms modeling approaches differ based on scope, specifications, assumptions, etc. 
Building an applied model is a costly, rigorous process that requires time and effort to be spent 
on assembling a database, the formulation of the theoretical underpinnings, the estimation of 
parameters and shocking the model in simulations. The choice of between partial and general 
equilibrium model appears to be crucial for researcher. As the present research is focused on a 
single industry related policy reform, the analysis is carried out on a partial equilibrium basis. A 
GSIM model developed by Francois and Hall (2003) appears to be capable of answering the 
questions posed by the research question in this thesis. The GSIM has been applied in a wide 
variety of research projects related to international trade liberalization. Tariff reform studies were 
carried out using GSIM in various specific industries such as milk, wheat, and bananas as well as 
more aggregated sectors of the economy.  
Given the scope and depth of the research possible, GSIM is chosen to be the most 
suitable tool for analysis. Firstly, GSIM is flexible. It allows for a disaggregated sector specific 
analysis while maintaining global scope. Its partial equilibrium nature implies that the analysis 
can focus on a specific tariff line level trade between countries of interest and aggregated regions. 
Secondly, the GSIM framework offers transparency. The model captures the welfare effects of 
trade policy changes (tariff reduction) in a disaggregated fashion. It means that the GSIM makes 
a clear distinction between producer, consumer, national effects and sources of economic 
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adjustments (production increase etc.) (Francois and Hall 2003). Thirdly, GSIM offers the 
analytical capacity required for the purpose of this particular research. The model allows for a 
simulation of trade policy changes (bilateral tariff reductions) among trading countries. Finally, 
GSIM uses comprehensive yet relatively accessible data, utilizes minimum computational 
requirements and is therefore considered user-friendly.  
5.2 The GSIM model 
A Global Simulation Model has been developed by Francois and Hall (2003). GSIM is a 
partial equilibrium model widely used for an industry level analysis of trade liberalization. It 
assesses changes in welfare, prices, output and trade flows as a result of tariff removal and/or 
reduction of production/export subsidies. It is a user-friendly spreadsheet model that handles up 
to 25 regions and is available for public use. The model estimates the effects of trade 
liberalization in terms of changes in bilateral trade effects, welfare effects (producer surplus, 
consumer surplus and change in tariff revenue), price and output changes. The model inputs 
include bilateral trade at world prices, initial bilateral import tariffs, final bilateral import tariffs, 
composite demand elasticities, industry supply elasticities and elasticities of substitution.  
The description of the model will follow that provided by Francois and Hall (2003) and 
complemented by Jammes and Olarreaga (2005) explanations that appear to be clearer at times. 
The model’s solution set is reduced to the global prices that clear the global market (Francois and 
Hall 2003). Global equilibrium prices are then used to back solve for national results. It uses the 
log-linear (percentage change) representation of import demand, combined with generic export-
supply equations. The reduced-form system of equations that includes as many equations as there 
are exporters is then solved for the set of world (exporter) prices. A detailed description of the 
equations is provided in section 5.3, Model equations, below. 
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The GSIM model is based on the assumption of national product differentiation, also 
known as the Armington assumption. The Armington assumption states that products originating 
from different regions (countries) are imperfect substitutes to each other. The GSIM 
differentiates between imports from different sources and treats them as imperfect substitutes 
based on national product differentiation. The product heterogeneity comes from the different 
bilaterally imposed policies (tariffs, etc.). In other words, different bilateral policies result in 
tariffs that can vary from one country to another and determine the elasticity of substitution 
(Armington elasticities). Armington elasticities determine the extent to which imports change by 
source. The GSIM also holds the elasticity of substitution constant and equal across all sources. 
This reduces the influence of market share on elasticities to zero. The relevant own and cross-
price elasticities are also derived and included in global supply and demand definitions and 
clearing conditions.  
5.3 Model equations 
Demand side 
According to GSIM, within each importing country v, import demand within product 
category i of goods from country r is a function of industry prices and total expenditure on the 
category:  
(1) M𝑚,𝑝,𝑥 = f(P𝑚,𝑝,𝑥, Pm,p,≠x, Ym,p), 
where  Ym,p is the total expenditure of country m on product p, Pm,p,x is the domestic price in 
country m (tariff inclusive) of product p exported by x,  Pm,p,≠x, is the price of other varieties.  
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The export price received by exporter on world markets and internal prices for the same 
good are connected as follows  
(2) P𝑚,𝑝,𝑥 = (1 + 𝑡𝑚,𝑝,𝑥)𝑃𝑝,𝑥
∗ = 𝑇𝑚,𝑝,𝑥𝑃𝑝,𝑥
∗  
where 𝑡𝑚,𝑝,𝑥 is the tariff imposed by country m on its imports of product p from x, and 𝑃𝑝,𝑥
∗  is the 
world price of product p exported from x. Here, T=1+t is the power of the bilaterally imposed 
tariff. It is the proportional price markup achieved by the tariff t (Francois and Hall 2003).  
By differentiating equation (1), applying the Slutsky decomposition of partial demand and taking 
advantage of zero homogeneity property of Hicksian demand Francois and Hall (2003) arrive at 
the following equation: 
(3) 𝜀𝑚,𝑝,𝑥 = 𝜃𝑚,𝑝,𝑥(𝜀𝑚,𝑝 + 𝜎𝑚,𝑝) 
(4) 𝜀𝑚,𝑝,≠𝑥 =  𝜃𝑚,𝑝,≠𝑥𝜀𝑚,𝑝 − (1 − 𝜃𝑚,𝑝,≠𝑥)𝜎𝑠,𝑝 
Equations (3) and (4) define own price and cross-price demand elasticities respectively. 
The 𝜃𝑚,𝑝,𝑥 is the expenditure share of product p exported by x in total imports of product p by 
country m, 𝜀𝑚,𝑝 < 0 is the composite import demand function for product p in country m,  
 𝜎𝑚,𝑝 > 0 is the elasticity of substitution in country m for product p exported from different 
origins (countries), 𝜀𝑚,𝑝,𝑥 is the import demand function in country m for product p exported 
from x, 𝜀𝑚,𝑝,≠𝑥 is the cross-price elasticity of the import demand function in country m for 
product p exported from x, when the price of product p exported from another countries ≠ x 
changes. 
Supply side 
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Export supply to the world markets is defined by the function of the world price 𝑃∗: 
(5) 𝑋𝑝,𝑥 = 𝑔(𝑃𝑝,𝑥
∗ ) 
Through differentiation of equation (5) and rearranging in percentage terms one obtains the 
following definition of the export supply elasticity: 
(8) ?̂?𝑝,𝑥= 𝑒𝑝,𝑥?̂?𝑝,𝑥
∗ , or 𝑒𝑝,𝑥 =
?̂?𝑝,𝑥
?̂?𝑝,𝑥
∗ > 0 
Market Equilibrium   
Now that demand and supply for each product is specified, the percentage world price 
change following the trade reform in one or more countries can be obtained by solving for the 
new price that re-equilibrates demand and supply for this product (in our case, wheat origination 
from different countries) (Jammes and Olarreaga 2005). Due to the imperfect substitutability, 
changes in tariffs on products exported by other countries result in changes in import demand as 
suggested by the cross-price elasticity in equation (3). 
Jammes and Olarreaga (2005) explain the solution to changes in world prices following 
the trade policy reform in matrix notation. Matrix notation helps to obtain a quick analytical 
solution. 𝐸𝑚,𝑝 is a diagonal x by x matrix of elasticities in country m for product p, where the 
elements on the diagonal are equal to 
𝜀𝑚,𝑝,𝑥
𝑒𝑝,𝑥
 as provided by (3) and (8) and the off-diagonal 
elements are given as:  
𝜀𝑚,𝑝,≠𝑥
𝑒𝑝,𝑥
. 𝑃𝑝
∗ is a vector of percentage changes in world prices of product p 
and  𝑇𝑚,𝑝 is a vector of changes on the tariff imposed by country m on imports of p from different 
countries. Further, Jammes and Ollarreaga (2005) denote 𝐸𝑝=∑ 𝐸𝑚,𝑝 𝑚  and 𝐵𝑝 = ∑ 𝐸𝑚,𝑝𝑚 𝑇𝑚,𝑝 . 
Imposing market clearing conditions and solving for the changes in world prices yeilds: 
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(9) 𝑃𝑝
∗= (𝐼 − 𝐸𝑝)
−1
𝐵𝑝 
Once the percentage change in world prices is obtained using equation (9), changes 
export and import quantities, changes in tariff revenue, (import) consumer surplus and (export) 
producer surplus can be found.  
Equation (8) is used to back solve for export quantities. Differentiating equation (1) gives 
us: 
(10) ?̂?𝑚,𝑝,𝑥 = 𝜀𝑚,𝑝,𝑥?̂?𝑚,𝑝,𝑥 + ∑ 𝜀𝑚,𝑝,≠𝑥≠𝑥 ?̂?m,p,≠x 
Equation (10) is used to back solve for import quantities.  
A linear approximation to the change in (exporter) producer surplus is calculated as 
follows: 
𝛥𝑃𝑆𝑝,𝑥 = 𝑃𝑝,𝑥
∗ 𝑋𝑝,𝑥?̂?𝑝,𝑥
∗ (1 +  𝑒𝑝,𝑥
?̂?𝑝,𝑥
∗
2
) , 
where ?̂?𝑝,𝑥
∗  is the percentage change in the world price of good p exported from x (Jammes and 
Olarreaga 2005).  
The linear approximation to changes in tariff revenue is provided as: 
Δ𝑇𝑅𝑚,𝑝,𝑥 = 𝑡𝑚,𝑝,𝑥𝑀𝑚,𝑝,𝑥𝑃𝑚,𝑝,𝑥
∗ ((?̂?𝑚,𝑝,𝑥) + ?̂?𝑚,𝑝,𝑥
∗ (1 + 𝜀𝑚,𝑝,𝑥)), 
where ?̂?𝑚,𝑝,𝑥 is the percentage change in the tariff imposed by m on good p exported from x. 
The consumer surplus is given as follows: 
Δ𝐶𝑆𝑚,𝑝 = ∑ 𝑀𝑚,𝑝,𝑥𝑃𝑚,𝑝,𝑥 
∗
𝑥 𝑇𝑚,𝑝,𝑥 ( 
1
2
𝜀𝑚,𝑝[?̂?𝑚,𝑝]
2
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(?̂?𝑚,𝑝) −  ?̂?𝑚,𝑝), 
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where ?̂?𝑚,𝑝=∑ 𝜃𝑚,𝑝,𝑥?̂?𝑝,𝑥
∗
𝑥 + ?̂?𝑝,𝑥 
The change in welfare is a sum of changes in producer surplus, consumer surplus and 
tariff revenue by country. 
5.4 Data 
This study includes a total of 24 regions including major wheat exporting, importing 
countries and aggregated regions such as the rest of the world (ROW), the rest of South America, 
the rest of Eastern Europe and the rest of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The data 
required for the empirical analysis using the GSIM is trade values by the origin and destination, 
bilateral tariffs, trade with self16, elasticieties of composite demand, supply and substitution. The 
full list of countries included in the model is reported in Table 1 in the Appendix A. (See 
Appendix A Table 1). 
The year 2007 has been chosen as the base year for the analysis. The wheat market in 
2007 is more or less representative of global equilibrium in the market. No major wheat bans 
occurred in 2007 unlike in the following years that also coincided with the world wide economic 
crisis and major spikes in food prices. Also, in 2007 none of the KRU countries have yet joined 
the WTO. The bilateral trade flows data at the HS17 four-digit level that corresponds to wheat and 
meslin18 and comes from the trade statistics for international development (Trademap n.d.) of the 
International Trade Center.  
                                                          
16 Trade with self is an estimate of the sales in the domestic market. It is estimated as follows: Domestic production-
Exports. Since the bilateral trade data is in world prices, domestic production was calculated using world prices. 
Data for calculating Domestic production is sourced from the FAO statistics website.  
17 HS is the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) of tariff nomenclature is an 
internationally standardized system of names in accordance with the World Customs Organization. HS-1001 
corresponds to wheat and meslin.  
18 Meslin refers to a mixture of wheat/rye. In trade, it is classified with wheat and represents an insignificant part of 
the entire HS 1001 wheat and meslin category. 
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Bilateral tariff data comes from numerous sources. The ad valorum19 equivalents for 
specific MFN, non-MFN and other preferential tariffs were obtained from the market access map 
database (MacMap n.d.) of the International Trade Center and the Centre d’Etude Prospectives et 
d’Informations Internationales, WTO’s Tariff Download Facility Tariff (Tariffdata n.d.), Tariff 
Analysis Online also by WTO (TAO n.d.) and World Integrated Trade Solution by the World 
Bank (WITS n.d.). The data has been complemented and reported electronically along with the 
comments and sources.  
Aggregate import demand elasticity (𝐸𝑚) values for most of the countries were adopted 
from Kee, Nicita and Ollareaga (2004). They provide a systematic estimation of import demand 
elasticities for a broad group of countries at a very disaggregated level. Import demand elasticity 
values for the EU, Kazakhstan, Russia, Pakistan, and aggregated regions such as the rest of CIS, 
the rest of South America, Eastern Europe and the ROW were approximated due to lack of data. 
Approximations are based on the rational provided by Kee, Nicita and Ollareaga (2004)20. Import 
demand elasticities assigned to each country and region are reported in Table 2 in the Appendix 
A (See Appendix A, Table 2).  
An export supply elasticity (𝐸𝑥) value of 1.5 (Francois and Hall 2003) was adopted for 
the major exporters of wheat (Australia, the US, Canada, Argentina, the EU (27), Brazil); for 
other countries and regions, the value 0.5 was adopted. This corresponds to the assumption of “a 
small country” (Holzner, 2008). Supply elasticity values for Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine 
vary between 0.5, 1 and 1.5 depending on the three alternative scenarios explained below.  
                                                          
19 Ad valerum tariff on imports is specified as a percentage of the value of the good. 
20 Kee, Nicita, and Ollareaga (2004) found the following:  
   Import demand for homogeneous goods is more elastic than for heterogeneous goods. Import demand is more     
   elastic and the disaggregate level. Thus, the higher is the disaggregation in terms of HS digit code, the larger is the    
   magnitude (more negative) of the import demand. Import demand is more elastic in larger countries. This is due to  
   the ability the large economy country to substitute away from the import to domestic production. 
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An elasticity of substitution (𝐸𝑠) value of 5 (Francois and Hall 2003) was adopted for all 
countries and regions in the model. The value of 5 is often used in the literature (Fukita, 
Krugman and Venables 2000).  
5.5 Scenarios 
Three scenarios were analyzed in this study. Scenarios vary based on the assumption of 
“small versus big country”, or in other words the relative effect of being able to respond to 
changes in market conditions. The first scenario assumes that Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan 
(RUK) are able to respond to changes in demand quickly. Therefore, the three countries take the 
export supply elasticity value of 1.5 (as with the rest of the major wheat export suppliers). The 
second scenario assumes that RUK are less responsive to demand changes. In this case, RUK 
were each assigned export supply elasticity of value 0.5. A third scenario is a worst-case scenario 
that assumes RUK countries to be nonresponsive to demand changes (export supply elasticity 
equal to zero), meaning RUK countries are not able to adjust their production output and respond 
to prices they are going to receive. Supply response elasticities of less than 1.5 in KRU countries 
might occur due to a limited price transmission between world and domestic markets. Countries 
in transition such as KRU countries often exhibit weak or limited price transmission. It means 
that firms in transition economies are less price responsive compared to those in modern market 
economies. Price transmission inadequacies usually occur due to problems in infrastructure and 
institutional barriers.  Small values of supply elasticities assume that KRU countries will not be 
able to respond to changes in prices due to their transition problems and constraints which were 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
The results of the scenarios run using the GSIM model are reported in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6: Results 
6.1 Reporting the results 
The GSIM model was run with the bilateral trade matrix at world prices, initial matrix of 
bilaterally applied import tariffs on wheat in ad valorem form, and the final matrix of bilateral 
tariffs in ad valorem form and finally the elasticities, yield trade liberalization effects. Trade 
liberalization effects are estimated in terms of changes in welfare, specifically, changes in 
producer surplus, consumer surplus, trade flows, tariff revenues and prices. The GSIM model 
generates new prices that clear markets. These prices yield new trade values and welfare effects. 
A new trade liberalization equilibrium is assumed to be reached as a result of the KRU 
countries’ accession to the WTO. Trade liberalization effects are specifically reflected in terms of 
changes in tariffs applied to the imports of wheat originating from the KRU region. As part of the 
accession to the WTO, the Black Sea region wheat exporters are entitled to have MFN tariffs 
applied to their exports rather than the previous non-MFN tariffs that were applied when they 
were non-members 
 Table 9 summarizes the liberalization effects for the first scenario21. Liberalization effects 
are reported in thousand dollars as well as in the percentage of total cereal production value for a 
better visualization of the magnitude of the changes. Values in the form of percentages of gross 
cereal production in 2007 for aggregated regions were dropped and separate countries are 
reported. Summaries of the effects for the other two scenarios will be reported in Table 1, 2 and 3 
in the Appendix B. The three tested scenarios have not yielded significantly different results. 
                                                          
21 1st scenario assumes that KRU countries are able to respond to price changes with increase production and 
quantities available for export and, therefore, each is assigned a supply elasticity equal to 1.5 
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Different supply elasticity values for KRU countries had marginal impact on the outcome. Hence, 
further discussions of results will be based upon scenario 1 outcomes. 
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Producer 
surplus
Consumer 
surplus
Tariff 
revenue
Change in 
subsidy 
payments
Net welfare 
effect
Change in 
Overall 
Consumer 
Prices
Change in 
Output
Producer 
Price for 
Home Good
Market 
Price for 
Home Good
A B C D E= A+B+C+D
Australia -3376.8 1678.7 0.0 0.0 -1698.1 -0.10% -0.2% -0.10% -0.10%
Argentina -1092.1 434.5 14.1 0.0 -643.4 -0.03% 0.0% -0.03% -0.03%
Canada -3350.3 402.6 0.2 0.0 -2947.6 -0.07% -0.1% -0.07% -0.07%
EU (27) -11457.2 24056.7 -22144.3 0.0 -9544.8 -0.09% -0.1% -0.04% -0.04%
US -7452.6 3587.8 -141.3 0.0 -4006.1 -0.06% -0.1% -0.05% -0.05%
Turkey -119789.5 316798.3 18874.9 0.0 215883.7 -4.22% -2.9% -1.96% -1.96%
Kazakhstan 72003.7 -44908.1 0.0 0.0 27095.7 2.27% 3.4% 2.27% 2.27%
Ukraine 5492.6 -5919.9 0.7 0.0 -426.6 0.25% 0.3% 0.22% 0.22%
Brazil -60.6 530.2 17.9 0.0 487.5 -0.02% 0.0% -0.01% -0.01%
Russia 116093.1 -84017.7 0.7 0.0 32076.1 0.95% 1.4% 0.93% 0.93%
Algeria -64.6 606.0 0.0 0.0 541.3 -0.04% 0.0% -0.02% -0.02%
Egypt 1844.8 -11573.5 0.0 0.0 -9728.7 0.41% 0.3% 0.20% 0.20%
Morocco 13.4 -150.6 0.0 0.0 -137.2 0.01% 0.0% 0.01% 0.01%
Iran 559.4 -1177.2 -252.9 0.0 -870.8 0.06% 0.0% 0.03% 0.03%
China -526.3 528.2 20.7 0.0 22.6 0.00% 0.0% 0.00% 0.00%
Japan -12.4 688.7 130.5 0.0 806.8 -0.05% 0.0% -0.01% -0.01%
Korea -0.3 194.3 1.1 0.0 195.1 -0.04% 0.0% -0.02% -0.02%
Indonesia 0.0 230.7 5.3 0.0 236.0 -0.03% 0.0% 0.00% 0.00%
India 1736.2 -6674.5 -6560.3 0.0 -11498.6 0.02% 0.0% 0.01% 0.01%
Pakistan 570.1 -1217.2 -238.0 0.0 -885.2 0.02% 0.0% 0.01% 0.01%
rest CIS 4701.6 -15069.5 3.9 0.0 -10364.0 0.91% 0.6% 0.41% 0.41%
rest East EUR 83.0 -609.5 -641.0 0.0 -1167.5 0.07% 0.0% 0.02% 0.02%
rest South Am -1013.1 1863.5 153.6 0.0 1004.0 0.00% 0.0% 0.00% 0.00%
ROW -27163.2 81380.8 -58537.0 0.0 -4319.5 -0.32% -0.3% -0.22% -0.22%
Producer 
surplus
Consumer 
surplus
Tariff 
revenue
Change in 
subsidy 
payments
Net welfare 
effect
Australia -0.068 0.034 0.000 0.000 -0.034
Argentina -0.018 0.007 0.000 0.000 -0.011
Canada -0.042 0.005 0.000 0.000 -0.037
EU (27) -0.017 0.036 -0.034 0.000 -0.014
US -0.010 0.005 0.000 0.000 -0.005
Turkey -1.313 3.473 0.207 0.000 2.367
Kazakhstan 2.738 -1.708 0.000 0.000 1.030
Ukraine 0.115 -0.124 0.000 0.000 -0.009
Brazil 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.004
Russia 0.826 -0.598 0.000 0.000 0.228
Algeria -0.007 0.062 0.000 0.000 0.055
Egypt 0.035 -0.218 0.000 0.000 -0.183
Morocco 0.002 -0.019 0.000 0.000 -0.017
Iran 0.009 -0.019 -0.004 0.000 -0.014
China -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Japan 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.004
Korea 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002
Indonesia 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
India 0.002 -0.009 -0.009 0.000 -0.015
Pakistan 0.008 -0.017 -0.003 0.000 -0.013
Welfare effects, in % of 2007 gross cereal production value 
other (in %)welfare (in 1000 dollars)
Source: Results extracted from the GSIM model output and own calculations
Table 9 Summary of Effects Scenario 1
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In general, it can be said that the welfare effects of the world wheat trade liberalization as 
a result of the KRU countries accession to the WTO are modest. Total welfare effects in 
thousand dollars were related to individual countries’ gross cereal production values in 2007 (see 
Table 9). Net welfare effects as a share of gross cereal production value appear to be insignificant 
for most of the countries. To put these in perspective, the loss in Australian exports is around 11 
million US dollars when the total value of exports of wheat from Australia is equal to 1.6 billion 
US dollars. Another example, the loss in EU’s value of exports is approximately 46 million US 
dollars when the total value of exports is 3.8 billion US dollars. Therefore, for big exporting 
countries like Australia, Canada, US and EU, these values of loss are relatively insignificant. 
Turkey, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Algeria experience positive net welfare effects. The rest of the 
countries experience negligible net welfare effects. 
Freer trade for KRU countries does not lead to significant changes in prices across the 
countries and regions. Those countries with the most restrictive tariffs (the EU, Turkey, China 
and ROW) show price declines after freer trade.  Price declines are higher in Turkey because 
more wheat is imported than exported. As net exporters, KRU countries experience increase in 
wheat prices due to higher market access. Since trade liberalization is not uniform across all 
markets countries experience different changes in prices. As large exporters’ trade diverts to freer 
markets, prices slightly rise in Egypt, Morocco, Iran, India, Pakistan, the rest of CIS and the rest 
of Europe. Slightly smaller amounts of wheat − in value terms − are exported to these countries 
after trade liberalization, which explains the marginal rise in prices.  
The greatest tariff difference before and after accession is expected from EU, Turkey and 
China. Results show negative tariff revenues for EU. They are, however, very small. Turkey 
experiences positive changes in terms of tariff revenues. Larger volumes of exports might have 
compensated for overall reductions in tariffs. The difference in China’s MFN and non-MFN 
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tariffs is large. However, the reductions in tariffs faced by KRU wheat imports to China and 
potential increases in import volumes were not captured by the model as a result of the absence 
of trade between KRU countries and China 2007. This shortcoming is due to model limitations 
that are discussed in Chapter 8. To address this flaw, positive trade will be recorded between 
KRU and China in 2007 to allow the model to capture the effects of tariff reductions. Another 
run of the model indeed showed increase in trade between all KRU countries and China as 
predicted. Increase in trade between China and KRU countries is very likely, particularly with its 
immediate neighbors Russia and Kazakhstan. Added trade between KRU countries and China did 
not alter previously obtained welfare effects to any important degree and had no impact on the 
directions (signs) of the changes.    
 Changes in trade flows appear to be consistent with the theory. More trade occurs in freer 
markets. Table 10 demonstrates the changes in trade flows after the liberalization. Trade flow 
changes are reflected in percentage terms.  
 
 
Australia Argentina Canada
EU 
(27)
USA Turkey Kazakhstan Ukraine Brazil Russia Algeria Egypt Morocco Iran China Japan Korea Indonesia India Pakistan rest CIS
rest East 
Europe
rest South 
America
ROW
Australia 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 -0.6
Argentina 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -1.0
Canada 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.3 0.0 0.2 1.7 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 -0.8
EU (27) -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 -12.6 0.0 1.1 0.0 3.0 0.1 1.5 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 3.6 0.5 0.2 -0.9
USA 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 -13.4 0.0 1.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 1.6 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 -0.8
Turkey 0.0 0.0 9.6 9.6 0.0 -3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.2 10.1 0.0 8.7
Kazakhstan 0.0 0.0 0.0 46.5 0.0 35.2 -3.3 -10.5 0.0 -8.5 -11.5 -10.1 -11.3 -11.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -11.5 -11.3 -11.3 -8.0 -11.1 0.0 33.3
Ukraine 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.3 31.6 43.3 0.0 -0.2 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.2 -1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 -0.8 0.0 9.4
Brazil 0.0 -25.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.1
Russia 0.0 0.0 0.0 -4.9 0.0 125.2 3.4 -3.8 0.0 -1.8 -4.8 -3.3 -4.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 -4.8 -4.8 -4.6 -4.6 -1.3 -4.4 0.0 5.9
Algeria 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Egypt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Morocco 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.1
Iran 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
China 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.1
Japan 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Korea 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Indonesia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
India 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.1
Pakistan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.2
rest CIS 0.0 0.0 0.0 -2.3 0.0 -14.8 0.0 -1.2 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 -2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
rest East 
Europe
0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 -14.7 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0
rest South 
America
-0.3 -25.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.1
ROW 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.9 1.0 -336.0 0.0 2.0 1.1 0.0 1.0 2.4 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 4.5 1.4 1.1 0.0
Source:	Results	extracted	from	GSIM	model.
Table 10. Percent changes in trade values of world wheat trade flows after liberalization
o
ri
g
in
destination
5
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As is expected KRU, countries experience substantial changes in trade flows due to the 
tariff reductions manifest in important importing markets. Russia experiences a large increase in 
trade with Turkey, Kazakhstan, ROW and a marginal decrease in trade with the rest of the world 
importers. Increase in export values from Russia to Turkey and ROW are due to tariff reductions. 
The three percent increase in trade between Russia and Kazakhstan can not be attributed to tariff 
reductions but rather to a big difference in changes in prices in Russia and Kazakhstan.  
Ukraine’s value of exports to the US, Turkey and ROW increased by 32, 43 and 9 percent 
respectively. There is also a marginal increase in trade with Russia, Egypt, the rest of the CIS as 
well as slightly negative changes in trade with EU, Morocco and rest of Europe. This is due to 
increased access to some markets and, hence, redistribution effects from one market to another. 
Kazakhstan trades 47, 35 and 33 percent more with EU, Turkey and ROW respectively. These 
changes also stem from tariff reductions. There is slightly less trade occurring with the rest of 
Kazakhstan’s trading partners due to diversion of trade flows as a result of increased access in 
other markets. It is also worth mentioning that the EU’s currently applied wheat import tariffs for 
high quality wheat and medium or low quality wheat from WTO members is 0 and 95 euro per 
ton. High quality wheat is identified as minimum 14 percent protein content while everything 
else below 14 percent is considered medium or low quality wheat. In the future, as a result of 
accession to the WTO, KRU country exporters might benefit from the absence of quotas for 
“high quality wheat”.  
The EU, the US, the rest of the CIS and the ROW have lower trade values with Turkey as 
their relative market access conditions erode relative to the KRU countries in Turkish markets. In 
general, major wheat exporting countries such as Argentina, Australia, Canada, the EU and the 
US do not appear to be negatively impacted by KRU’s accession to the WTO to any important 
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degree. As their relative markets access conditions erode in the Turkish (for the EU and the US) 
and ROW markets (these are mostly represented by Middle Eastern and African markets), their 
trade flows are diverted and marginally distributed among other countries and regions at reduced 
prices.   
 Trade diversion as a result of KRU countries’ obtaining improved access to markets has a 
marginal impact on wheat output values as well. Table 11 provides changes in production. The 
price changes as a result of the trade liberalization lead to changes in output produced. There is 
an output decline in Australia, Argentina, Canada, the EU, the US, Turkey and the ROW as a 
result of the decline in prices. The opposite is true for the countries experiencing higher prices for 
wheat. The KRU countries respond to higher prices with more output. Countries such as Egypt 
and the rest of the CIS experience increase in prices for domestic goods due to lower values of 
imports and, as a result, produce more output.  
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Country percent in tonnes
original 
production 
in 2007 in 
tonnes
Australia -0.16% -213 13569380
Argentina -0.05% -78 16486530
Canada -0.10% -203 20054000
EU (27) -0.06% -752 120263646
US -0.08% -442 55820400
Turkey -2.94% -5072 17234000
Kazakhstan 3.41% 5619 16466900
Ukraine 0.33% 457 13937700
Brazil -0.01% -3 4114060
Russia 1.40% 6917 49368000
Algeria -0.03% -7 2318960
Egypt 0.30% 225 7379000
Morocco 0.01% 2 1582630
Iran 0.04% 64 15886600
China 0.00% -38 109298296
Japan -0.01% -1 910100
Korea -0.02% 0 7351
Indonesia 0.00% 0 0
India 0.01% 73 75806700
Pakistan 0.01% 28 23294700
rest CIS 0.62% 847 13618304
rest East EUR 0.03% 23 6805676
rest South Am 0.00% -1 2987894
ROW -0.33% -1764 53993183
Table 11. Change in output percentage and value
Source:Results extracted from GSIM model and own 
calculations  
As can bee seen from Table 11, changes in output as a response to trade liberalization are, 
in general, modest. Some countries produce more and some less. Just looking at the percentage 
change can be deceiving, therefore percentage changes were reported in terms of tonnes. 
Changes in production values are negligible when compared to the original production tonnage 
recorded for 2007.  
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To ease the process of visualization of the results, KRU countries’ changes in trade flow 
maps are provided in Appendix C. These maps were all generated using arc GIS22 software. 
Once again, it is worth mentioning that the results should be analyzed with great caution 
because they were generated by the partial equilibrium approach and not a general equilibrium 
approach. Nevertheless, this research enhances the understanding of trade liberalization and 
explains the possible outcomes of the KRU countries’ accession to the WTO. 
6. 2 Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity analysis was performed to ensure the robustness of the results over changes in 
elasticity values. Assigning higher supply elasticities result in smaller producer price effects and 
larger output effects. Altering the supply elasiticities across countries slightly changes the 
magnitude of changes in consumer and producer welfare and as is predicted has no effect on the 
direction (sign) of the changes.  
Lower values of substitution eleasticities lead to lower quantity and price response, and 
hence, lower welfare effects. Increasing these elasticity values does the opposite, but has no 
effect on the direction of the changes. Results of the sensitivity analysis are provided in 
Appendix B, Table 4 and Table 5. 
 
 
 
                                                          
22 Arc GIS is a geographic information system that allows to visualizes values, in our case, trade flows in terms of 
American dollars.  
 56 
6.3 Conclusion 
The GSIM model was used to examine the impact of the KRU countries’ accession to the 
WTO on world wheat trade. World wheat trade liberalization, reflecting the move to the MFN 
tariff as a result of accession, was simulated. Accession to the WTO is expected to bring more 
market access for KRU countries. Simulation results are consistent with the theory. Increased 
access to markets leads to more trade between KRU countries and previously restricted markets. 
KRU countries trade with now freer markets such as Turkey, the EU, China and the ROW 
expands. Major traditional wheat exporters such as Australia, Canada, the EU, and the US do not 
seem to be negatively impacted to any important degree from the accession of the KRU countries 
to the WTO. Their relative market access conditions, however, erode in Turkish (for the EU and 
the US) and ROW markets (these are mostly represented by Middle Eastern and African markets) 
and their trade volumes are diverted and marginally distributed among other countries and 
regions at reduced prices. Trade liberalization is not uniform across regions and, hence, leads to 
different net welfare changes across countries. However, those welfare changes appear to be 
modest.  
Chapter 7 provides a discussion of the important findings and implications arising from 
the simulation exercises. 
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Chapter 7: Important findings and implications 
This thesis indicates that the accession of the KRU countries to the WTO can be expected 
to result in observable changes in trade flows in the world wheat trade. Although net welfare 
effects appear to be relatively small, there is a potential for intensification of trade among KRU 
countries and their trade partners. Increases in the KRU’s countries’ export opportunities would 
come at the expense of the other major wheat exporters such as Canada, the US, Australia and 
the EU as their competitiveness erodes in several major importing markets (Turkey, the EU, and 
the ROW). The loss, however, does not appear to be significant in terms of their dollar values. 
Major exporters will be able to compensate the market access erosion by diverting and 
distributing exports among other importing markets. Canada, the US, Australia and the EU’s 
market presence is more diverse in terms of geography than that of the KRU region. These 
countries hold an advantage in terms of transportation costs at this point in time. It is also 
believed that these countries have established themselves as reliable exporters in contrast to KRU 
countries. KRU countries have volatile production and are well known for their export bans. 
Therefore, traditionally large exporters such as the US, Canada and Australia are less likely to 
suffer as a result of the KRU’s accession to the WTO.  
Accession to the WTO can bring market access opportunities for KRU countries. 
Running scenarios with constrained supply elasticities among KRU countries did not alter the 
end results in any significant way. It is, however, questionable whether producers can capitalize 
on the opportunities provided by the WTO membership. This depends on factors such as future 
productivity, domestic policies, adaptability to climate changes and other socio economic factors. 
Infrastructure is one of the major constraints for KRU countries. Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan 
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are all putting considerable effort into improving the infrastructure for storing and transporting 
grain, especially for access to remote markets. If KRU countries overcome their present 
constraints and use their wheat producing resources efficiently, their presence in the world wheat 
trade arena will remain strong and gain in prominence.  
Considering the majority of the large trading nations are already part of the WTO, less 
attention is given to the difference between the MFN and non-MFN tariffs. However, the later 
difference appears to be substantial especially in trade of agricultural commodities. It is 
important to note that the data on non–MFN tariffs is not easily accessible. WTO member 
countries are not obligated to report their schedules on non-MFN tariffs. Thus, it takes a major 
effort to compile non-MFN tariffs that are applied by member states of the WTO. No other 
studies which used pre-accession tariff rates were found. Large files of tariff schedules for some 
countries containing both MFN and non-MFN tariffs are accessible on the WTO website site. 
Information provided on the online websites like TRAINS and MacMap are at times inconsistent 
or provide MFN tariffs only.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
8.1 Summary of results  
The WTO administers the agreed rules of international trade among 159 countries. 
Countries join the WTO to become integrated into the modern global economy. One of the mort 
important benefits that WTO membership provides is improved and more secure access to 
member countries’ markets. Before enjoying the security provided by WTO membership, each 
country wishing to join the WTO has to go through a four-stage accession process. After joining 
the organization, countries are entitled to receive “most favored nation” treatment. It means, 
among other things, that new members move from facing non-MFN tariffs to MFN tariffs which 
all members of the WTO are extended.   
World wheat is and likely will always be an important part of the global food basket. 
Wheat is both relatively nonperishable in storage and transport making it an ideal commodity for 
international movement. To date, wheat trade accounts for one third of the world grain trade and 
this trade is expected to double by 2050 in response to the growing world population.  
Black Sea wheat exporting countries are emerging as major exporters and producers of 
wheat in the world. Their growing importance in world wheat trade has been evident since the 
early 2000s. Growing wheat exports from this part of the world are due to several factors 
including the collapse of the Soviet regime and its consequences in the agricultural sector.  The 
decline in livestock numbers, marginal increase in yields and favorable weather conditions are 
believed to be the factors that contributed to the increase in wheat exports among KRU countries.  
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KRU countries have long wished to join the WTO. Negotiations for all three countries 
were long and are still in progress for Kazakhstan. Ukraine was the first to become an official 
member of the WTO in 2008, Russia joined in 2012 and Kazakhstan is expected to follow in the 
near future.  
As an important wheat producing region, accession of the KRU countries to the WTO is 
expected to bring about important realignments in the world wheat trade flows as the countries 
move from facing non MFN to MFN tariffs in the world import markets.  
This empirical study employing a partial equilibrium, multi region GSIM model provided 
useful insights into the implications of the accession of the KRU countries’ into the WTO. Major 
exporting and importing countries (23 in total) including aggregated regions were included in the 
research. A number of simulations of world wheat trade liberalization were carried out to assess 
changes in world wheat trade flows, prices and changes in economic welfare. The results suggest 
that KRU countries gain access and, therefore, increase export values to previously highly 
protected markets such as the EU, Turkey, China and the ROW. More market access results in 
higher prices for KRU countries. This will come at the expense of the traditional major exporters 
such as the US, Australia, Canada and the EU. Losses as a result of the market access erosion for 
these countries are small in financial terms. Their diversified presence in all markets across the 
world allows them to divert and re-distribute their exports to other markets at slightly lower 
prices. In short, accession to the WTO brings export opportunities for KRU countries with no 
dramatic declines for the rest of the world. There are, of course, both losers and winners. 
However, both net welfare losses and gains to the rest of the countries, however, appear to be 
marginal. Major traditional wheat exporters will experience market access erosion in some 
markets but are most likely to cope with this problem by selling more to other markets. 
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8.2 How it adds to the literature 
This thesis investigates an important real event in the world’s wheat trade. Studies 
relating to KRU countries trade in specific commodities are scarce and largely descriptive. A 
study of world wheat trade liberalization carried out by Gomez-Plana and Devadoss (2004) 
pursues similar question, but fails to mimic the real world wheat trade scenario. The authors 
assume complete removal of all bilateral tariffs across all major wheat importing and exporting 
countries. Complete removal of trade barriers is, however, unlikely. In addition, Gomez-Plana 
and Devadoss (2004) did not differentiate between MFN versus non-MFN tariffs and appear to 
arrive at the average between the two.  
This study contributes to the general understanding of the increasing importance of wheat 
exporters from the Black Sea region in world wheat trade. It provokes further discussions related 
to the accession of the KRU countries into the WTO. 
8.3 Limitations of the Study  
Limitations of this study can be divided into two categories: those that are attributable to 
the GSIM model and those specific to this study. This research utilizes GSIM model approach to 
assess the effects of the trade liberalization. Although the model has significant advantages, it 
also has a number of limitations that should be kept in mind. Firstly, it is worth remembering that 
GSIM’s partial equilibrium approach belies its focus on only part of the total economy. It means 
that the model does not account for intersectoral linkages and possible income or resource re-
allocation effects throughout the whole economy. Therefore, changes in the rest of the economy 
are not accounted for by the GSIM. This implies that the results of the trade liberalization 
scenarios might be under or overestimated. Secondly, the GSIM model is a static model that 
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compares scenarios at a given point in time.  It does not allow for long term adjustments or 
transition periods that allow for dynamic economic effects. Thirdly, the model assumes full price 
transmissions. However changes in border prices might not be fully transmitted to producers and 
households, hence, actual responses to reforms might differ in reality from those projected by the 
analysis.  Finally, the assumptions made with regard to the elasticity values may be a limitation. 
Values assigned across regions might not be accurate in reflecting the responsiveness to the price 
changes. The model is based on the representative agent assumption that does not differentiate 
between various groups within a particular region. The responsiveness to the price is kept the 
same among all of them.  
The GSIM model analysis is based on the observed volumes of bilateral trade at a certain 
time. It captures the responses to trade liberalization between countries that are trade partners, 
but does not capture possible “new trade” that can potentially occur between non trading partners 
after the reduction of restrictive tariff rates.  In order to address this shortcoming, the value of 
one dollar was recorded to trade values that were equal to zero to allow for positive trade 
responses where tariff changes are substantial23.  
Another major limitation specific to this study is lack of data. The production and export 
subsidies data are not included to the model. Therefore, this study is not inclusive of non-tariff 
based trade distorting factors that could shed more light on the effects of KRU countries 
accession to the WTO. 
 
                                                          
23 For example, China and Kazakhstan is not reported as trading in 2007. However, since the difference in China’s 
MFN vs non MFN tariffs is large, another model run was performed to test for this shortfall. Initial trade volumes 
from KRU-China were altered from zero values to one dollar (see chapter 6) 
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8.4 Areas of Future Research  
Future research can potentially address the shortcoming of the present study. Most 
importantly, future studies should focus on trade distorting instruments such as industry specific 
production subsidies. Agricultural subsidization is one of the most difficult topics in the WTO. It 
is expected that the existing agricultural subsidies will be reduced following the accession to the 
WTO. However, developing countries accessing the WTO are given a transition period to lower 
the levels of agricultural support. Of course, not all types of subsidization are prohibited by the 
WTO regulations. The WTO regulations distinguish three types of support policies that are 
classified under three color boxes: green, blue and red24.  
For example, major wheat exporting countries such as Canada, the US and Australia have 
already expressed concerns regarding the level of transport subsidization for wheat exports, 
particularly in Kazakhstan.  These transportation subsidies are most likely classified under the 
red box. As is suggested by the name “red box”, these subsidies are prohibited by the WTO. 
Kazakhstan officials are using the “landlocked” argument and focusing on retaining a transition 
period. 
In short, agricultural support policies are important in international trade. Therefore the 
inclusion of other trade distorting measures such as subsidization can yield more revealing 
insight into the effects of the accession to the WTO.  
 The shortcomings embedded in the modeling approach could be improved by the 
development of a new modeling initiative that would require considerable effort and time. 
Researchers could expand the scope of the existing general equilibrium models to assess the 
                                                          
24 A more detailed discussion on the WTO regulations regarding support policies can be obtained from WTO (2010) 
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economy wide effects of the accession of the countries to the WTO and the ramifications for 
agriculture in general. The general equilibrium approach is data intensive yet could be carried out 
successfully given enough time and resources.  
8.5 Conclusion  
The contribution of this thesis includes an assessment of world wheat trade liberalization 
following the accession of the Black Sea region exporters into the WTO. It measures the effects 
of trade liberalization on world wheat trade flows, prices and economic welfare across different 
exporting and importing regions. Although, the thesis is limited by the exclusion of non-tariff 
based measures due to lack of data, the research provides insights to the changes that may be 
expected in world wheat trade. The thesis differs from other studies because it uses a partial 
equilibrium approach to explore a real world case rather than a hypothetical issue. Further, the 
thesis provided a discussion regarding the global trade in wheat, the KRU countries’ emergence 
in the world wheat markets and their accession to the WTO. This thesis indicates that increased 
access to world markets as a result of accession to the WTO brings export opportunities for KRU 
countries at no major loss to other traditional exporters. Whether the Black Sea region exporters 
will be able to capitalize on the opportunity is, nevertheless, questionable and, hence, as is what 
the future holds.  
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Appendix A 
Figure 1. Map of KRU’s exit routes to the world markets 
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Australia EU(27) is: rest CIS is: rest East Europe is: rest South America is:
Argentina Belgium Armenia Croatia Bolivia
Canada Bulgaria Azerbaijan Serbia Chile
Eu(27) Czech Republic Belarus Montenegro Colombia
US Denmark Kyrgyzstan Bosnia Ecuador
Turkey Germany Moldova Herzigovina Guyana
Kazakhstan Estonia Tajikistan Albania Paraguay
Ukraine Ireland Uzbekistan Kosovo Peru
Brazil Greece Turkmenistan Macedonia Suriname
Russia Spain Uruguay
Algeria France Venezuela
Egypt Italy
Morocco Cyprus
Iran Latvia
China Lithuania
Japan Luxembourg
Korea Hungary
Indonesia Malta
India Netherlands
Pakistan Austria
rest CIS Poland
rest East Eur Portugal
rest South Am Romania
ROW Slovenia
Slovakia
Finland
Sweden
United Kingdom
Table 1. List of countries included in the model
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Composite Demand
Australia -2.49
Argentina -2.52
Canada -2.29
Eu(27)* -3
US -3.39
Turkey -1.97
Kazakhstan* -1.46
Ukraine -1.46
Brazil -3.38
Russia* -2
Algeria -1.59
Egypt -1.78
Morocco -1.45
Iran -1.87
China -2.54
Japan -4.05
Korea -2.08
Indonesia -2.09
India -3.26
Pakistan* -1.25
rest CIS* -1.25
rest East Eur* -1.25
rest South Am* -1.5
ROW* -1.5
From: Kee, Nicita and Ollareaga (2004)
* approximations
Table 2. Aggregate Import demand 
elasticities
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Appendix B 
The three tested scenarios lead only to marginally different results. Different supply 
elasticity values for KRU countries had an only small impact on the outcome. Hence, main 
discussions of results were based upon scenario 1 outcomes.  
Assigning different supply elasticities for KRU countries is as a crude proxy for potential 
differences in transition economies’ ability to respond to price changes compared to modern 
market economies. First scenario assumes that the wheat industry in Russia, Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan (RUK) are able to respond to changes in demand to a similar degree as the industry 
in modern market economies. Therefore, the three countries take the export supply elasticity 
value of 1.5 (as with the rest of the major wheat export suppliers). Second scenario assumes that 
RUK are less responsive to demand changes. In this case, RUK were each assigned export supply 
elasticity of value 0.5. Third scenario, where KRU countries are each assigned export supply 
elasticity values equal to zero, is a worst-case scenario that assumes KRU countries are not able 
to respond to any degree to changes in prices. 
 
Producer 
surplus
Consumer 
surplus
Tariff 
revenue
Change in 
subsidy 
payments
Net welfare 
effect
Change in 
Overall 
Consumer 
Prices
Change in 
Output
Producer 
Price for 
Home Good
Market 
Price for 
Home Good
Kazakhstan 72003.7 -44908.1 0.0 0.0 27095.7 2.27% 3.4% 2.27% 2.27%
Ukraine 5492.6 -5919.9 0.7 0.0 -426.6 0.25% 0.3% 0.22% 0.22%
Russia 116093.1 -84017.7 0.7 0.0 32076.1 0.95% 1.4% 0.93% 0.93%
Kazakhstan 71198.5 -44908.1 0.0 0.0 26290.5 2.27% 3.4% 2.27% 2.27%
Ukraine 5486.6 -5919.9 0.7 0.0 -432.6 0.25% 0.3% 0.22% 0.22%
Russia 115554.7 -84017.7 0.7 0.0 31537.7 0.95% 1.4% 0.93% 0.93%
Kazakhstan 70795.9 -44908.1 0.0 0.0 25887.9 2.27% 3.4% 2.27% 2.27%
Ukraine 5483.6 -5919.9 0.7 0.0 -435.6 0.25% 0.3% 0.22% 0.22%
Russia 115285.5 -84017.7 0.7 0.0 31268.4 0.95% 1.4% 0.93% 0.93%
Source: extracted from the GSIM model results
Table 1. Summary of Effects  
welfare (in 1000 dollars) other (in %)
scenario2
scenaario 3
scenario 1
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Table 1. provides a brief comparison of the three scenarios. Export supply elasticity of 
value 0.5 in Scenario 2, resulted in slightly lower value of producer surplus across KRU 
countries and, hence, lower values of net welfare effects in Kazakhstan and Russia as well as a 
marginal increase in Ukraine’s negative net welfare effects. The magnitude of changes, however, 
appears to be negligible. Scenario 3, where export supply elasticity is equal to zero across KRU 
countries, yields lower producer surplus values than in all previous two scenarios. Once again, 
these changes appear to be very small. Changes in prices were insufficient to produce any 
changes in other results values rounded at ten digit level25.  
The model was, however, tested for the responsiveness to changes in supply elasticities 
and yielded theoretically consistent results. 
 Sensitivity analysis was performed and reported in Table 2 and 3 of the Appendix B.
                                                          
25 The difference in price changes across three scenarios was negligible to the extent that no discernible impact on 
trade flows was detected given the degree of rounding built into the GSIM model. 
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Sensitivity analysis was performed to ensure the robustness of the results over changes in 
elasticity values. Table 3 reports sensitivity analysis results with respect to export supply 
elasticities. Assigning higher supply elasticities result in smaller producer price effects and larger 
output effects. Altering the supply elasiticities across all countries slightly changes the magnitude 
of changes in consumer and producer welfare and, as is predicted, has no effect on the direction 
(sign) of the changes. 
Producer 
surplus
Consumer 
surplus
Tariff 
revenue
Change in 
subsidy 
payments
Net welfare 
effect
Change in 
Overall 
Consumer 
Prices
Change in 
Output
Producer 
Price for 
Home Good
Market 
Price for 
Home Good
A B C D E= A+B+C+D percent percent percent percent
Australia -3077.8 1530.2 0.0 0.0 -1547.5 -0.10% -0.2% -0.10% -0.10%
Argentina -994.0 393.9 14.1 0.0 -586.0 -0.03% -0.1% -0.03% -0.03%
Canada -3090.8 371.5 0.2 0.0 -2719.1 -0.06% -0.1% -0.06% -0.06%
EU27 -10624.9 24062.1 -21974.9 0.0 -8537.7 -0.09% -0.1% -0.04% -0.04%
US -7014.4 3380.1 -141.3 0.0 -3775.6 -0.05% -0.1% -0.05% -0.05%
Turkey -105538.9 303962.6 21856.2 0.0 220279.9 -4.05% -3.5% -1.75% -1.75%
Kazakhstan 64178.8 -39831.5 0.0 0.0 24347.4 2.02% 4.0% 2.02% 2.02%
Ukraine 4689.6 -5085.0 0.6 0.0 -394.8 0.21% 0.4% 0.19% 0.19%
Brazil -51.2 480.9 16.7 0.0 446.4 -0.02% 0.0% 0.00% 0.00%
Russia 103918.1 -75022.6 0.6 0.0 28896.1 0.84% 1.7% 0.84% 0.84%
Algeria -55.6 561.8 0.0 0.0 506.1 -0.04% 0.0% -0.02% -0.02%
Egypt 1505.6 -10164.6 0.0 0.0 -8659.0 0.36% 0.3% 0.17% 0.17%
Marocco 9.5 -115.6 0.0 0.0 -106.0 0.01% 0.0% 0.01% 0.01%
Iran 433.5 -982.4 -224.3 0.0 -773.2 0.05% 0.0% 0.02% 0.02%
China -464.1 466.3 19.2 0.0 21.4 0.00% 0.0% 0.00% 0.00%
Japan -10.8 643.1 122.1 0.0 754.4 -0.05% 0.0% -0.01% -0.01%
Korea -0.3 182.7 1.0 0.0 183.4 -0.03% 0.0% -0.01% -0.01%
Indonesia 0.0 219.7 5.1 0.0 224.8 -0.03% 0.0% 0.00% 0.00%
India 1404.1 -5812.6 -5851.0 0.0 -10259.6 0.02% 0.0% 0.01% 0.01%
Pakistan 405.9 -984.0 -212.0 0.0 -790.2 0.01% 0.0% 0.01% 0.01%
rest CIS 3635.7 -12865.4 3.4 0.0 -9226.3 0.78% 0.6% 0.32% 0.32%
rest East Europe 63.3 -530.1 -573.2 0.0 -1040.0 0.07% 0.0% 0.02% 0.02%
rest South America -816.7 1608.5 143.6 0.0 935.4 0.00% 0.0% 0.00% 0.00%
ROW -25186.9 81240.9 -58012.3 0.0 -1958.3 -0.32% -0.4% -0.20% -0.20%
Source: Results extracted from GSIM model
Table 2. Sensativity analysis. Higher values of supply elasticities(increase by 0.5 across all countries)
Summary of Effects
welfare other
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Table 4 provides a sensitivity analysis results with respect to elasticities of substitution. 
Lower values of substitution elasticities lead to lower quantity and price response, and hence, 
lower welfare effects. Increasing these elasticity values does the opposite, but has no effect on 
the direction of the changes. 
Producer 
surplus
Consumer 
surplus
Tariff 
revenue
Change in 
subsidy 
payments
Net welfare 
effect
Change in 
Overall 
Consumer 
Prices
Change in 
Output
Producer 
Price for 
Home Good
Market 
Price for 
Home Good
A B C D E= A+B+C+D percent percent percent percent
Australia -560.2 278.0 0.0 0.0 -282.2 -0.02% 0.0% -0.02% -0.02%
Argentina -170.6 52.0 16.9 0.0 -101.7 0.00% 0.0% 0.00% 0.00%
Canada -508.4 61.0 0.0 0.0 -447.4 -0.01% 0.0% -0.01% -0.01%
EU(27) 3010.9 14157.9 -20572.6 0.0 -3403.9 -0.06% 0.0% 0.01% 0.01%
US -1198.8 713.9 -153.3 0.0 -638.2 -0.01% 0.0% -0.01% -0.01%
Turkey -1380.5 194694.4 -86921.6 0.0 106392.2 -2.63% 0.0% -0.02% -0.02%
Kazakhstan 38745.2 -24395.5 0.0 0.0 14349.8 1.24% 1.9% 1.24% 1.24%
Ukraine 2283.9 -2552.9 0.0 0.0 -269.0 0.11% 0.1% 0.09% 0.09%
Brazil 11.0 62.6 1.1 0.0 74.7 0.00% 0.0% 0.00% 0.00%
Russia 60248.9 -43753.2 0.0 0.0 16495.7 0.49% 0.7% 0.49% 0.49%
Algeria 1.6 -65.4 0.0 0.0 -63.8 0.00% 0.0% 0.00% 0.00%
Egypt 109.0 -5383.2 0.0 0.0 -5274.1 0.19% 0.0% 0.01% 0.01%
Morocco 8.1 -316.6 0.0 0.0 -308.5 0.03% 0.0% 0.00% 0.00%
Iran 12.9 -350.8 -35.1 0.0 -373.0 0.02% 0.0% 0.00% 0.00%
China -52.8 53.9 0.9 0.0 2.0 0.00% 0.0% 0.00% 0.00%
Japan 7.3 101.4 17.9 0.0 126.6 -0.01% 0.0% 0.00% 0.00%
Korea 0.0 31.0 0.1 0.0 31.1 -0.01% 0.0% 0.00% 0.00%
Indonesia 0.0 -23.3 -0.4 0.0 -23.7 0.00% 0.0% 0.00% 0.00%
India -683.9 -1954.1 -911.9 0.0 -3549.8 0.01% 0.0% 0.00% 0.00%
Pakistan 59.2 -410.2 -32.2 0.0 -383.2 0.01% 0.0% 0.00% 0.00%
rest CIS 915.3 -6604.6 0.3 0.0 -5689.0 0.40% 0.1% 0.08% 0.08%
rest East Europe 49.2 -477.7 -82.7 0.0 -511.2 0.06% 0.0% 0.01% 0.01%
rest South America -39.2 179.1 6.6 0.0 146.4 0.00% 0.0% 0.00% 0.00%
ROW -9135.0 67465.2 -60882.1 0.0 -2551.8 -0.26% -0.1% -0.07% -0.07%
Table 3. Sensativity analysis. Lower values of substitution elasticities (equal to 2 across all countries)
Summary of Effects
welfare other
Source: Results extracted from GSIM model
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The maps above were generated to the ease the visualization of the results. They were all 
generated using GIS software. Each map presents the changes in trade flows between KRU 
countries and their export destinations. Increases or decreases in trade is represented by green and 
pink colours respectively.  
Countries and regions with no colouration represent no or very small change in quantities 
traded. The most important changes in trade flows are also indicated with callout boxes.
 
